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ABSTRACT  
 
This study investigates the relationship between the current migration crisis in Europe and the 
escalation of far-right voting which has been witnessed since it’s beginning. In order to do so this 
study utilized correlation experiments and detailed case studies to explore the relationship 
between legislative vote shares and asylum applications for the years 2009-2017 in the EU 
member states of Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK. Control variables of GDP, 
unemployment and terrorist attacks have also been utilized to measure alternative causes of far-
right voting. Results of these experiments vary quite a bit from state to state - finding differing 
potential causal factors in each case study. Germany, France and the UK show results which 
indicate that an increase in asylum applications potentially influence far-right voting habits. 
Greece does not show this  type of result, but does show correlation with control variables. 
Hungarian experiments however do not produce correlation with any variables tested, but has the 
strongest presence of far-right activity which may indicate that Hungarian far-right success is 
attributed to their long history of far-right activity.   
ii 
 
DEDECATION 
 
For Henry. 
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Dr. Anca Turcu for her guidance and support in 
the undertaking of this thesis, without which I would have been unable to compete this process; 
and for asking the hard questions which have made me a better researcher and student. I would 
also like to thank Dr. Barbara Kinsey for her support for this project and in helping me to 
understand the limitations of research design.   
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................... 3 
The Fundamentals of Far-Right Wing Ideology......................................................................................... 3 
Populism ................................................................................................................................................ 4 
Euroscepticism in the Populist Message ............................................................................................... 6 
Nationalism in the Far-Right Agenda .................................................................................................... 7 
Inclusionary vs. Exclusionary Nationalism ............................................................................................ 8 
Nativism ................................................................................................................................................ 9 
Demand Side Theories on Far-Right Voting ........................................................................................ 10 
Economic Voting and the Far-Right .................................................................................................... 11 
Security Concerns................................................................................................................................ 12 
Supply Side Theories on Far-Right Voting ........................................................................................... 12 
The Rise of the Extreme Right in Five European Destination States ...................................................... 14 
Hungary ............................................................................................................................................... 14 
Germany .............................................................................................................................................. 18 
France .................................................................................................................................................. 20 
Greece ................................................................................................................................................. 25 
UK ........................................................................................................................................................ 27 
v 
 
Increased Far-Right Voting in Europe ..................................................................................................... 30 
Migration Crisis Push Factors .................................................................................................................. 32 
Hypothesis 1 ............................................................................................................................................ 33 
Hypothesis 2 ............................................................................................................................................ 33 
METHODS ................................................................................................................................... 34 
The Dependent Variable ......................................................................................................................... 34 
The Independent Variables ..................................................................................................................... 35 
Control Variables..................................................................................................................................... 36 
A Experiments ......................................................................................................................................... 37 
B Experiments ......................................................................................................................................... 38 
C Experiments ......................................................................................................................................... 38 
D Experiments ......................................................................................................................................... 39 
E Experiments ......................................................................................................................................... 39 
DATA ........................................................................................................................................... 41 
The Dependent Variable ......................................................................................................................... 41 
The Independent Variables ..................................................................................................................... 43 
Control Variable 1 – GDP .................................................................................................................... 46 
Control Variable 2 – Unemployment .................................................................................................. 47 
Control Variable 3 – Acts of Terrorism ................................................................................................ 48 
vi 
 
Experiment Results ................................................................................................................................. 49 
FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................... 52 
Hungary ................................................................................................................................................... 52 
Germany .................................................................................................................................................. 54 
France...................................................................................................................................................... 56 
Greece ..................................................................................................................................................... 58 
UK ............................................................................................................................................................ 61 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 63 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research ..................................................................................... 66 
APPENDIX: VARIABLE DATA ................................................................................................ 70 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 76 
 
  
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Far-Right European Parties: 2009-Present ................................................................... 41 
Table 2: Hungary Results.............................................................................................................. 50 
Table 3: German Results ............................................................................................................... 50 
Table 4: France Results ................................................................................................................ 50 
Table 5: Greece Results ................................................................................................................ 50 
Table 6: UK Results ...................................................................................................................... 51 
Table 7: Total Asylum Applications (IV1) .................................................................................... 70 
Table 8: Asylum Applications – Selected Nationalities (IV2) ....................................................... 71 
Table 9: Asylum Applications – Selected Nationalities (IV2) ....................................................... 72 
Table 10:Country GDP per Capita (CV1) .................................................................................... 73 
Table 11: Unemployment Rates (CV2) ......................................................................................... 74 
Table 12: Terrorist Attacks (CV3) ................................................................................................ 75 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Far-Right Legislative Vote Shares (DV) ....................................................................... 43 
Figure 2: Total Asylum Applications (IV1) ................................................................................... 44 
Figure 3: Applications of Selected Nationalities (IV2) ................................................................. 45 
Figure 4: GDP per Capita (CV1) .................................................................................................. 47 
Figure 5: Unemployment Rates (CV2) .......................................................................................... 48 
Figure 6: Incidents of Terrorist Attacks (CV3) ............................................................................. 49 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Middle Eastern North African (MENA)i Migration crisis is one that has seen the largest 
movement of individuals across European borders since the end of WWII (Kingsley, 2017). At 
the peak of the migration crisis, in 2015 alone, 1,046,599 migrants reached Europe by both land 
and sea (“Mixed Migration”, 2015). Fifty percent of these migrants were Syrian (“Mixed 
Migration”, 2015), fleeing the ongoing Syrian Civil War. Though migration slowed somewhat in 
2016 and 2017, these years still saw unprecedented amounts of human traffic reaching Europe in 
the hundreds of thousands – at 390,432, and 186,768, respectively (“Migration Flows”, 2018). 
While most individuals fleeing conflict and economic instability first find their way to 
surrounding MENA states like Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, conditions there seldomly provide 
them with better circumstances, and therefore they attempt to reach Europe in hopes of safety 
and a better life (Kingsley, 2017). Migrants face various obstacles while trying to emigrate to 
Europe, including political opposition, physical barriers, and EU regulations.  These regulations 
dictate how member states should accommodate asylum seekers. In fact, it was just after World 
War II (the last great European migration of this magnitude) that the 1951 UN Convention on 
Refugees; which established many of the regulations that currently exist regarding the treatment 
of migrants (and the sub-category of “refugee”) within the European Union (Park, 2015). 
Since 2011, refugees have been arriving primarily from the Middle Eastern states of: Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and from Africa, the regions of: Eritrea and sub-Saharan Africa (Kingsley, 
2017). Other countries of origin include the nations of Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan 
(Park, 2015). The Migration Crisis began, in 2011, with a massive inpouring of Tunisian 
refugees to Italy (Park, 2015). While the crisis began in 2011, the migration surge began in 2014, 
and it was at this time which Europe began to feel the effects of Migration, as large numbers of 
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Syrians, Afghan, Eritreans and sub-Saharan African refugees increased following the Arab 
Spring. 
 Thus far, Europe has seen over a million individuals from the MENA region immigrate since the 
beginning of the migration crisis in 2011; some of which have been welcomed by EU member 
states like Germany and Sweden; while others have been largely rejected, by states like Hungary, 
France and Greece (DeSousa, 2016; Hoel, 2015). While the political attitudes of individual 
member states surely factor into the acceptance or rejection of immigrants fleeing conflict zones 
like the MENA region, it may also be argued that due to a lack of burden-sharing and early 
coordination on behalf of EU decision making bodies, many of the participating EU nations are 
largely unprepared. Still, all EU states (regardless of resources) are (at least in theory) held to the 
standards of the 1951 UNHR Convention; among other EU regulations, like the Schengen 
Agreement, which allows for the free movement of peoples within the EU (Kingsley, 2017). 
Individual immigration policies of destination states in Europe combined with their adherence, or 
lack thereof, to the aforementioned EU law regarding asylum, greatly affects the likelihood of 
successful relocation of migrants from the MENA conflict regions to a safer Europe (Hoel, 2015; 
Kingsley, 2017; Park 2015). However these are not the only factors which influence successful 
immigration. Europe has for decades witnessed some support for far-right parties which espouse 
anti-immigration rhetoric among topics of nationalism and xenophobia (Betz, 1991). Though 
recent emergence of popular far-right parties in European parliaments which historically has 
little to no far-right legislators (like UKIP the UK or AfD in Germany) indicates winds of 
change. Because far-right or nationalist parties can surely influence legislative matters, it is 
important to consider how the recent increase in immigration to Europe which we call the 
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“migration crisis” may influence popular and electoral support for these parties. Therefore, this 
study seeks to determine the effect of the migration crisis on far-right voting in Europe.  
In order to investigate the relationship between migration and far-right voting this thesis first 
explores differing theories on why people vote for right wing parties. Next, it examines patterns 
of increased far-right wing voting in recent decades and reviews the immigration response efforts 
of five European destination states in the European Union. Their political response in terms of 
party rhetoric, civilian response and asylum policies come under scrutiny. In order to test the 
central question of this thesis which asks how migration may affect far-right voting; data from 
the legislative elections of five case studies (Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK) is 
analyzed along with asylum applications for these five nations. Alternative causal variables are 
also explored as this legislative data is also compared to unemployment, GDP, and security 
concerns like acts of terrorism. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FAR-RIGHT WING IDEOLOGY 
The current refugee crisis can and should be viewed as just some of many factors of the bigger 
picture of the rise in far-right wing ideology. Just as the issue of migration did not simply begin 
in 2011, with the mass exodus of Middle Easterners fleeing the Syrian Civil War, the rise in far-
right parties did not begin with the Migration Crisis, but has been a process which began in the 
late 60’s and gained visibility in the 90’s (Betz, 1994). Therefore, it is helpful to understand how 
factors within and surrounding the Migration Crisis fit into the overall narrative of far-right 
philosophy. 
It must first be said that far-right politics/philosophy and immigration seem to be inextricably 
tied. In the various definitions of the far-right explored, each includes the preservation of the 
national population (i.e. nativism); an ideal which is logically diluted by immigration (Betz, 
1991; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Roodujin, 2015). The effect of immigration is not debatable 
– the influx of foreign nationals will dilute the culture of a native population by injecting it with 
foreign cultural practices; bringing in new languages, religions, and social norms (Roodujin, 
2015). In reality the question becomes; are the far-right feelings about national identity valid? – 
for a long time, preserving national identity was a valid excuse to disavow the tired, poor, 
huddled masses; asking for assistance – but this time has long since past; leaving far-right 
rhetoric at essentially pre-1951 Refugee Convention Standards; backwards by about 70 years 
(Kingsley, 2017). 
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An observation of far-right wing politics, is the extreme noncyclic device with which it 
galvanizes support from a rural, or “grassroots”, base by identifying with said base (Roodujin, 
2015; Betz 1991) and using issues which are close to the hearts if these individuals, in order to 
obtain power. Whether the leaders follow through on their promises varies, if and when their 
power increases, parties of the radical right are more equipped to impose traditionalist and 
nationalistic agenda. 
Populism  
Populism may be broken down into two categories; inclusionary and exclusionary. Inclusionary 
populism (like it sounds) aims to extend benefits and rights to marginalized populations, while 
exclusionary populism aims to exclude certain groups (marginalized populations) from these 
benefits and rights (Golder, 2016, pg. 3). Far-right campaigns tend to utilize the latter.  
Emotional issues are central to a populist campaign (Postelnicescu, 2016), and it is populism 
which is associated with a grassroots “base”. Therefore is it difficult to pin down exactly what 
topics will be of importance to a particular campaign, without considering the context of the 
public (Postelnicescu, 2016). As emotional beings, this becomes very useful in galvanizing 
support the radical right agenda, which often panders to both material concerns, like 
employment; as well as non-material values, such as immigration and national identity. One 
emotional response which is has been extorted by far-right parties in the wake of the migration 
crisis is fear of the unfamiliar – this fear mongering and the lack of a united European identity 
has impacted the European response to the Migration Crisis (Postelnicescu, 2016).  has been 
central in the effectiveness of populist politics, in that populist politicians wish to convince their 
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constituency that the political process has been exhausted beyond repair, and that there is no 
alternative to their extreme methods (Postelnicescu, 2016). 
Populism can be thought of as less a message, with common symbols (such as nationalism 
within the far-right message), and more of a tool. An example of how populism can pick and 
choose its message to fit it’s base within the current migration crisis, is the tendency for far-right 
parties to link Euroscepticism and a distain for the open borders created by the EU. This is not 
true in Belgium however, where the population is heavily dependent on the economic advantages 
of the EU (Roodujin, 2015), and therefore parties are careful to criticize an institution which 
provides this economic advantage. In examples like this it can be seen how populist parties use 
tactics like fear mongering or messages like Euroscepticism when politically beneficial and may 
omit this tactic when it is not. 
Within populist politics, the use of the “false Messiah” (Postelnicescu, 2016) presents a 
charismatic political actor who will “fix everything” – obviously very appealing to a 
disenchanted European public, in the wake of the financial crisis. However, this comes at the 
cost of democracy, in terms of increased authoritarian rule (Postelnicescu, 2016). A “false 
Messiah” can be seen in the current Migration Crisis in Hungary, as the current extreme right 
government of Victor Orban has taken several authoritative steps (which contradict EU 
regulation) like erecting fences to stop the flow of individuals, utilizing racial profiling of Middle 
Eastern individuals, and even encroaching on land surrounding their boarder with military (Hoel, 
2015). 
The lack of a shared European identity may seem trite in the face of factors like xenophobia, 
however the divisiveness among Europeans has definitely contributed to the overall 
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shortcomings in European response to increased migration (Postelnicescu, 2016). Since the 
formation of the EU in 1950, there have been radically different ideas among European nations – 
and even within the founding six members – about what the EU should look like (Olsen and 
McCormick, 2017). Why is it important to have a common identity? – with a common identity 
comes a common sense of responsibility, and with a shared sense of responsibility, comes the 
possibility of agreement of response tactics to the migration crisis – and as long as the far-right 
can keep Europe divided into separate nations, the chances of agreement on these issues remain 
diminished (Postelnicescu, 2016).  
Euroscepticism in the Populist Message  
As discussed above, far-right parties pander to those voters skeptical of European identity, the 
European Union, and the open boarders which come along with it, in order to advance an anti-
immigration agenda (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). If authoritarianism is added to the mix, we 
have what have been identified as Populist Right Parties (PRP) (Roodujin, 2015, pg. 2). However 
not all extreme right parties need be Eurosceptic (Roodujin, 2015). 
 For larger, more economically sound states like Germany and the UK, it makes sense that the 
populist right in these nations would be Eurosceptic, in an effort to discontinue the 
supplementing of poorer member states which they financially support. However, as discussed in 
regards to populism as a tool) Euroscepticism is not present in the Belgium’s far-right party 
(Roodujin, 2015) – which is not surprising as Belgium is highly dependent economically on the 
EU, and was present at its establishment. It is in this, and similar caveats that we can see how the 
extreme right can prey on the nationalistic sentiments of a nation when it is in their best interest, 
and how this (seemingly consistent in other instances) factor can be easily omitted.  
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In order to appeal to voters skeptical of entrenched politicians and their handling of economic 
issued, extreme right populists sell themselves as an “outsider”. This portion of the PRP is often 
poorer, possibly less educated, and susceptible to rhetoric which suggests immigrants will 
worsen a job market. Contrary to this, these politicians are actually often very experienced. By 
clearly selling themselves as something opposite than the truth, PRP’s show their ulterior 
motives (Betz, 1993; Roodujin, 2015). 
Nationalism in the Far-Right Agenda   
Nationalism and nativism and (rarely) fascism are the central tenants of extreme right-wing 
philosophy. While populism and Euroscepticism surface in far-right parties across Europe as 
tools for mobilization, it is these elements which exist varying degrees across far-right parties. In 
this ideology, exclusion of individuals nearly always depends on culture, religion or ethnicity 
(Golder, 2016, pg. 4). 
Considering the far-right goal of cultural preservation, unsurprisingly, nationalist rhetoric is a 
central in far-right philosophy and their ability relate to a population who fears the loss of 
national culture. Various definitions of nationalism exist, but what is central in all of them is the 
goal of keeping the population “native” or pure, for functions ranging from; preserving cultural 
identity, to homogeneity as the cure for societal ills (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017; Roodujin, 
2015) – therefore nativism often emerges as central in far-right wing philosophy as well. Both 
are key tools in communicating the  extreme right message.  
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Inclusionary vs. Exclusionary Nationalism  
Like populism, nationalism can be categorized at civic, and inclusionary nationalism; or ethnic, 
and exclusionary nationalism (Golder, 2016, pg. 4). Civic nationalists will accept those willing to 
assimilate, whereas ethnic nationalists will not. 
In a study of the role of nationalism on far-right voters, it is found that nearly all far-right voters 
are nationalists, but not all nationalists are far-right voters (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). 
Therefore nationalism, in it’s various measures, is a necessary condition for far-right voting, but 
not a sufficient one. Meaning that one must have national pride to vote right wing, but just 
because one has national pride does not mean one will vote far-right (Lubbers & Coenders, 
2017). Extreme right wing parties know this and therefore utilize nationalism to galvanize 
support.  
Nationalism is a useful identifier when trying to describe the far-right voter, but it is a bit more 
complicated than just a measure of national pride. Ethnic nationalism consists of ideas about 
genealogy and birthright, and the latter consists of the willingness of individuals to “play by the 
rules” of a nation. Therefore it is important to distinguish that higher levels of ethnic nationalism 
coincide with higher levels of far-right  voting as opposed to civic nationalism (Lubbers and 
Coenders, 2017). In a study on nationalistic attitudes, in a choice between the nation, Europe, 
world, etc; “people who picked the nation as most important to belong to are found to be more 
likely to vote for the radical right.” (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017) . This gravitation toward ethnic 
nationalism is evident in the far-right’s targeting of ethnic minorities, even when an effort is 
made to assimilate.  
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Nativism  
Similar to nationalism, which seeks to maintain a nations identity, nativism seeks to preserve a 
nations native population (Roodujin, 2015). Where a nation may form out of multiple cultural 
groups, nativism favors a population which has been native to that land, and excludes those who 
are not (Roodujin, 2015). Therefore it is unsurprising that nativism can be described as 
nationalism in addition to xenophobia (Golder, 2016, pg. 4). While nationalism is central in 
extreme right-wing ideology; nativism, in combonation with authoriterrianism and populism 
finds its place as a central tennent in ‘populist radical right’ ideology (a subset of extreme right 
parties) (Roodujin, 2015). It is important to consider nativism as an identifying factor in 
describing far-right voters, as it is nativism which naturally holds an anti-immigration attitude at 
its core and somewhat explains the anti-immigraiton attitudes which can be found across the 
populist radical right.  
In recent decades proudly claiming outright xenophobia has lost it’s appeal and been replaced 
with ethnopluralist nativism. In order to appeal to the sensibilities of the public, far-right parties 
have toned down what was once extremely racist rhetoric, while pushing the same sentiments 
(Golder, 2016; Roodujin, 2015). The concept of ethnopluralism is essentially the old separate 
but equal trick, where these extreme right-wing philosophers view separate cultures as unable to 
live harmoniously, and should therefore be kept separate, rendering homogenous populations 
(Golder, 2016). Another important characteristic of nativism which must be discussed (as it is 
inherent in both nativism and far-right philosophy), which is its strong authoritarian tendencies. 
As both wish to keep the national population heterogenous and traditional, a strong law or 
military presence is encouraged. With these sentiments in mind, it could be said that out of all 
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facets of far-right philosophy discussed within these summaries, nativism may be most central. 
Unlike nationalism, which provides sufficient, but not necessary conditions for far-right party 
identification; it could be argued that to be a nativist (and wish your population heterogenous) is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for far-right wing identification. 
Demand Side Theories on Far-Right Voting  
Multiple demand side theories are discussed which attempt to explain the recent increase in far-
right voter participation. The demand for far-right wing parties is considered in terms of 
grievances from the national population. Demand-side theories are organized into three groups, 
grievances due to; modernization, economy, and culture (Golder, 2016).   
The variance in these theories really exemplifies how the extreme right base is actually made up 
of a variety of demographics, which come to the extreme right for a variety of reasons, and 
therefore a multitude of factors may explain the rise in the far-right (for example: poorer 
supporters can be analyzed through Betz’s theories on globalization (Betz, 1994). Participation 
of traditionalists may be explained by theories regarding the increase in electoral volatility and 
the rise of autonomy and the reduction of authority (Minkenberg, 2000). While all 
supporters could be analyzed culturally, through social identity theory, which states that 
individuals wish to surround themselves with others like themselves, as this reinforces self-
esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
While demand is obviously necessary for a far-right party to gain power, it is equally important 
to look at those who are selling this ideology to the public (Golder, 2016). Supply side theories 
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of extreme right-wing voting include political opportunity structure, party organization, and 
ideology (Golder, 2016). 
Economic Voting and the Far-Right 
Non-material influences on far-right success like identity, national pride and xenophobia are 
prevalent in the coverage of the extreme right message. In addition, materialistic concerns of 
wealth and employment cannot be underestimated as variables in the support of far-right parties.   
Theories of economic voting state that incumbent parties are held accountable for the current 
economic state of a nation, and therefore economics drive voter choice (Hart, 2018). However, a 
more complex take on this theory is that under certain economic conditions (be they good or 
bad) a campaign can utilize these circumstances to win votes (Hart, 2018). It is in this way that 
we see how it is possible for far-right parties to utilize poor economic circumstance to win votes.  
The economic variable of unemployment plays a large role in partisan voting in Europe. A case 
study of the 2009 German legislative elections are a wonderful example of this. With both right 
and left parties sharing power (and therefore both held responsible as the incumbent party during 
a financial crisis), it may be observed which side of the spectrum voters lean toward during an 
economic crisis (Trein, Beckman & Walter, 2017). In the 2009 German elections, as the 
unemployment rate increased, support for the Social Democratic Party (a center left party) 
decreased among voters who identify as Social Democrats (Trein, Beckman & Walter, 2017). In 
terms of voter perception of economic stability, as economic stability increases so does support 
for right wing parties (Trein, Beckman & Walter, 2017).  
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Security Concerns 
Not dissimilar to the fear created by a shrinking labor market, or of a loss of cultural “purity” 
that comes with immigration, far-right parties often focus on security concerns to inflame anti-
immigration rhetoric. Security concerns such at terrorism have been established as influencing 
factors of far-right party success (Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Kibris, 2011). Acts of terrorism within 
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has sparked much interest regarding the effects of terrorism on 
voting behavior. It has been found that an increase in terrorism within Israel results in greater 
support for far-right wing parties (Berrebi & Klor, 2006). Likewise, the voting population of 
Turkey has been found to be highly sensitive to acts of terrorism (Kibris, 2011). Individuals who 
reside in countries which experience an increase in acts of terrorism generally hold their 
government accountable for these actions (Kibris, 2011), similar to theories on economic voting. 
This translates into increased support for far-right parties which are traditionally less sympathetic 
to terrorists and make fewer concessions to terrorist groups (Kibris, 2011). 
Supply Side Theories on Far-Right Voting  
One supply side theory of extreme right-wing voting considers the role of the media and parties 
in the rise of the extreme right (Ellinas, 2010). As competition among media outlets has 
increased, far-right parties have resorted to more and more sensational subject matter, in order to 
make headlines (Golder, 2016). This phenomenon of capitalism is very interesting, as you could 
suppose that any party rhetoric or activity which draws an emotional response would be favored 
by the media. However, as previously discussed, it is a well-documented tenant of extreme right-
wing populism to utilize emotional rhetoric to inspire a population. Therefore, whether a specific 
news outlet takes a dismissive, accommodative, or adversarial position on a particular far-
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rightactor or party, far-right parties in general are more attractive to news outlets due to their 
sensational nature, and therefore may have an increased media platform. Therefore, this theory is 
really a condition, under which all parties operate, but just happens to favor the far-right parties 
due to their shared sensationalist nature and emotional content.   
Other supply side causal theories favor competition as causation for the distribution of far-right 
philosophy. This may be the most obvious causal factor in terms of supply of far-right wing 
rhetoric. As previously explored, far-right parties use populism and emotional issues because 
they work, as we are emotional creatures.  As competition increases, parties would gravitate to 
extreme strategies. However this strategy only works when the mainstream parties are not 
preoccupying these issues (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2011; Kitschelt, 1997; Spies & Franzmann, 
2011). 
Broad observations of the supply/demand theory analysis of the rise in extreme right voting, are 
that it takes both sides to result in a successful far-right party, however with no demand for far-
right parties, they cease to exits. However this does not account for the possibility that demand 
could be low because what are typically considered far-right issues are being taken over by 
larger parties (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2011; Spies & Franzmann, 2011).  
The characteristics discussed above, in part, provide the makeup of the far-right parties gaining 
momentum in European parliaments today. Within these legislative bodies, exists the ability to 
make or break the chance of a safer European future for millions of individuals still arriving on 
European shores fleeing conflict in MENA regions. Some European governments have 
welcomed refugees in the face of the far-right strategy; while some European states have been 
unaccommodating but contain populations of civilians which defy the policies of their own 
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governments to help migrants in need (Kingsley, 2017). Therefore, a closer look at the party 
rhetoric, governmental response and public response of European host nations is merited. The 
five European nations of Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and the UK have been chosen to 
examine the European response to increased migration. These nations contain a variety of 
histories of far-right party involvement in their political processes. They have differing resources 
and geographies which make some nations more exposed to the crisis and left with more 
responsibility; and yet the emergence or strengthening of far-right parties has been observed in 
each nation – perhaps a closer look at these most different cases will illuminate their shared 
features and differences.  
THE RISE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT IN FIVE EUROPEAN DESTINATION STATES  
Hungary 
By 2015, the top nationalities which Hungary was reported to have received were; (primarily) 
Syrian, as well as Iraqi, Afghans and Kosovo nationals (Frontex).  Those approaching Hungary 
today will find a razor-wire fence along  its southern border with Serbia.  Those individuals who 
were able to enter Hungary, did so via the “Western Balkan Route” (Hoel, 2015, ch 4.1.2) Like 
France, Hungary cites the Dublin Agreement as cause to deem crossing the Hungarian border 
“illegal”, and as reason to deny responsibilityii .  
In order to get to this Western Balkan Route, migrants will have taken either; the Bulgarian-
Turkish or Greek-Turkish Route (Hoel, 2015, ch. 4.1.2). Individuals taking the Greek-Trukish 
route are primarily Afghani and Syrian (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017). Interest in Hungary as part of the 
Western Balkan Route stems from the relaxation of visa restrictions within five  Balkan nations 
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(Frontex). In 2013, Hungary recorded receiving 20,000 “illegal” migrants (Frontex). By 2015, 
this number increased dramatically and Hungary reported 764,000 “illegal boarder crossings” 
(Frontex). This is compared to 2010’s 2,000 border crossings (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017). Within this 
time, Hungary received 54,123 asylum applications from Syrians alone, between 2014 and 2015 
(Hoel, 2015, ch. 4.1.2). Unlike Italy, migration to, or ideally through, Hungary did not become 
wildly popular until 2014-2015. Increased popularity has also been attributed to the increased 
knowledge of the danger of crossing the Mediterranean (Kingsley, 2017) which prompted a 
massive shift to the Greek-Turkish rout by those who could afford it.  
One trend which is emerging unsurprisingly, it that migrants of more means, and possibly more 
education (ex. Syrians) experiment with different routes and have changed their plan of action; 
where as less wealthy groups continue to take the same routs they have taken for generations, 
(ex. sub-Saharan Africans leaving Libya, which locals claim has occurred for decades, and is not 
a result of recent, but long-term destabilization (Kingsley, 2017). 
Hungary’s attitude toward migration can be summed up as unnecessarily “restrictive”. Though 
Italy and Greece have been classified as restrictive as well, the xenophobic rhetoric and extreme 
measures taken by Hungary exceeded explanation by economic means (Hoel, 2015). While 
economic factors clearly contribute to the willingness of a state to accept refugees (as in this case 
it is the poorer European states which show less favor for refugees), it does not entirely explain 
the actions xenophobic actions of Hungary (DeSousa, 2016) - in fact, internal party politics 
likely play a larger role. 
To physically stop the flow of migration from Serbia to Hungary, in 2015 the Hungarian 
Parliament approved the building of a 175 km fence along the border with Serbia (Hoel, 2015). 
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To further legally impede refugees from entering Hungary, a law was soon passed which 
sentenced those who damage the fence - as can happen in border crossing - to deportation, or 
imprisonment; in violation of the Schengen Area (Hoel, 2015). Another legal obstacle which 
Hungary has installed is the changing of the Asylum Act, which allows Hungarian authorities to 
engage in profiling to reject asylum applications from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, if these 
individuals had passed through countries which they deem “safe”, without applying for asylum - 
a perversion of the Dublin Agreement (Hoel, 2015). And possibly most disturbing – the 
Hungarian Parliament has allowed the Hungarian military to use non-lethal force against 
migrants to “protect the boarders” (Hoel, 2015). 
Hungary’s government has pledged to take in 30 refugees – in comparison to the thousands 
promised to it’s EU neighbors, though in terms of ability to take in refugees, Hungary is entirely 
capable to accept refugees, with more available land, and a lower population density that the 
average EU member state.Therefore a lack of resources cannot explain Hungary’s xenophobic 
rhetoric or low recognition rate (DeSousa, 2016, pg. 22). Hungary recognizes by far the lowest 
asylum seekers of all EU states, with 9% in 2014 to nearly zero percent in 2015 (DeSousa, 
2016). 
Alongside policy examination, content analysis has been utilized to interpret reputable news 
sources in order to examine the rhetoric coming from member states (Hoel, 2016). This allows us 
to “hear” opinions of government officials and any civilian that might be interviewed or 
investigated. However, this does limit subject matter to persons/subjects of interest to a news 
source. From this method of analysis, we can see Hungary’s extreme xenophobia, along with 
rhetoric of other EU nations, which will be addressed later.  
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This content analysis, in addition to a review of Hungary’s legal obstacles categorizes Hungary’s 
response as “restrictive” and “is founded on xenophobia and anti-immigration policies and seeks 
to complicate the arrival of new asylum seekers” (Hoel, 2015). Tactics include physical, legal 
and social barriers. Rhetoric of the country’s leader, PM Viktor Orbán, is particularly telling of 
Hungary’s restrictive stance, as he claims that letting in Middle Easterners (note that he does not 
distinguish “Syrian” in this case), will lead to terrorism, homophobia and anti-Semitism 
(DeSousa, 2016; Hoel, 2015;). In this case it is important to state that Hungary is not dictatorial, 
and that this leader and his party has received popular support from Hungarians, indicating at 
least to some extent, the support of these opinions by the Hungarian population.  
In terms of party rhetoric, Hungary possibly leads the EU in objection to immigration. Which 
both Victor Orbán and his far-right party Fidesz are vehemently opposed, and incite 
sensationalist and divisive rhetoric when possible. In one example of this, Orban’s government 
sent out a survey regarding the migration crisis, with leading wording; stating: “Do you agree 
that mistaken immigration policies contribute to the spread of terrorism?” and “Do you agree 
with the government that instead of allocating funds to immigration we should support 
Hungarian families and those children yet to be born?” (Hoel, 2015, ch. 4.1.2). It is actions like 
this which elevate Hungary to the status of unnecessarily restrictive. In addition to supplying the 
population with leading questionnaires intended to incite fear (Hoel, 2015), Orbán has erected 
billboards and signs which tell migrants that they cannot take Hungarian jobs (Kingsley, ch 7, 
2017). This aggression can be somewhat explained by party politics (Kingsley, 2017). Though 
Victor Orbán leads a far-right party, even farther to the right lies the JOBBIK party. Therefore, 
in order to retain his conservative base, Orbán must seem hard line on immigration (Kingsley, 
2017, ch 7). 
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Germany  
In terms of immigration policy, Germany has a history of accommodating immigrants. In the 
early 90’s immigration to Germany peaked around 800 thousand individuals – due to the civil 
wars and unrest in former Yugoslavia and African countries. Throughout the mid 90’s and into 
the early 2000’s, German immigration declined. The Global Financial Crisis changed this, and in 
2009/2010, German immigration began to increase once again – at this point, mostly from 
Southern and Eastern Europe (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). In 2014 Germany began to see the 
effects of the Arab Spring and the subsequent Syrian Civil War, as the numbers of Syrian, Iraqi 
and Afghani individuals increased (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). In 2015, the number of 
immigrants to Germany peaked again at 1.1 million for this year alone, however this number 
began to decrease in 2016 slightly (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). Asylum applications decreased in 
2017 to 17,000. The reasoning behind this, though not yet empirically proved, is thought to be 
due to the closing of the Western Balkan Rout (by Hungary) and the EU/Turkey deal in March of 
2016 (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).  
Throughout the late 80’s and 90’s, far-right parties in Germany began to find success – peaking 
in 1993 – comparable to German voter behavior in recent federal and state elections in the 
aftermath of waves of refugees (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). 
During the far-rights earlier success causation cannot be attributed to political and labor market 
channels, as the naturalization process of this time in Germany and work permit regulations rule 
this out. However there is evidence to support welfare channels in terms of causation, as 
Germans were concerned about the redistribution of aid (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). Evidence 
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also points to non-economic channels. This includes factors like immigrant children attending 
schools and community involvement (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).  
In terms of policy, Germany is known as the leader in efforts to aid the victims of the migration 
crisis. In terms of accommodations, Germany has been very welcoming – with a major decision 
to ignore the Dublin III Agreement (Kingsley, 2017). A slightly shadier move on behalf of the 
German government were the threats made by the EU (facilitated by Germany) to bomb Libya if 
it did not control its borders (Kingsley, 2017). Though there was no threat of violence, Germany 
essentially bribed Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to shut the gate to the Western 
Balkan Route, disallowing Syrians access to the Western Aegean, or the Northern Bulgarian 
Routes to Europe.  Just one result of this deal is the arrest of over 80,000 Syrians trying to leave 
the Turkish coast for Greece in an attempt to immigrate to Europe (Kingsley, 2017). Therefore 
German behavior is not without criticism.  
If Germany is analyzed regionally, it is found that votes for the far-right are lower in areas with 
an increased number of foreigners where areas of little diversity result in higher support for the 
far-right (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). This is especially evident in Eastern Germany, where 
support for the AFD is the highest (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017), though in this study there is the 
possibility of endogeneity, as immigrants may avoid areas of little diversity. When looking 
strictly at voting over time, without regard to regional variation, there was a strong correlation 
between the voting intention for the AFD and the number of asylum applications, especially in 
the years 2015 & 2016 when the crisis peaked (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). Other comparisons 
may be drawn to the 90’s in terms regards to how poorly institutions provide; efficient 
bureaucracy, and accommodations to manage the influx (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). 
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In terms of party politics,  the German Alternative for Deutschland (AFD) is the first far-right 
party to enter the German Bundestag (Parliament) (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). In the 2017 
elections, the AFD campaigned heavily against immigration and won 13% of the vote, a big win. 
Their campaign, like those of the 90’s focused on asylum abuse, much as politicians focus on the 
“welfare abuse” in the United States (Otto and Steinhardt, 2017).  
Individuals in Germany generally support the route Chancellor Merkel has taken in the Refugee 
Crisis, though this support is complicated. More than half of Germans associate more risk than 
reward with immigration, however 81% believe in admitting refugees fleeing persecution in 
accordance with international law/ EU law (Gerhards et. all, 2016). This survey describes a 
selfless population, who is willing to do what is right and not what is easy or comfortable. 
France 
Unlike the porous border states of the EU, France has the luxury of 1. the ability to police it’s 
boarders, and 2. decide how many refugees it wishes to accept – unlike, say. Italy or Greece who 
must accept the individuals washing up on their shores. In 2015, France stated that they would 
accept 24,000, and then increased this promise to 30,000 refugees - as opposed to Germany’s 
500,000 (DeSousa , ch 3, 2016). Frances regulations regarding refugees are therefore defined as 
“selective entry” as opposed to Germany’s “unrestricted entry”. France, unlike the extreme 
examples of Germany/Sweden and Hungary, accepts a limited number of refugees and provides 
moderate accommodations. (DeSousa, 2016). In terms of Syrian Asylum Applications alone, 
France has received 20,348 as of 2016 (UNHCR). In 2017, France received 74,180 asylum-
seekers many of which have family in France (UNHCR).  
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The migrants which continue to arrive on Italian shores today are primarily African at this point; 
hailing mostly from Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia and others (Beardsley, 2017). Those who can afford 
to do so, avoid the Libyan springboard to Italy due to instability in the region and the danger of 
the Mediterranean Sea. This means that it is these, less wealthy nationalities which primarily 
continue to use France as an alternative to the Western Balkan Route. 
As previously described, the number of Syrians crossing the Mediterranean has decreased in 
2014, though this has done little to ebb the flow of migration by this route. The nationalities of 
individuals have somewhat returned (on this route only) to pre-2011 demographics – meaning 
primarily African, though the number of individuals seems to remain steady (Kingsley, 2017).  
The French/Italian Border Crisis 
One point of entry to France which has drawn quite a bit of media attention is the border that 
France shares with Ventimiglia, Italy. This particularly tense event at this French-Italian border 
town, concerned the movement of African migrants in 2015. French police were documented 
stopping individuals from crossing (EuroNews, 2015; Radio France Internationale, 2015). While 
this was quite the media event (especially as it documents the plight of African migrants, as 
opposed to focusing on Syrian’s exclusively), there is no real evidence that this practice is 
stopping.  
In this particular circumstance about a dozen French policemen were blocking about 100 African 
migrants due to lack of paperwork (which obviously isn't an EU criteria for crossing borders). 
French Authorities were given permission to do this by a Prefect Adolphe Colrat. It must also be 
stated that during this time that the Italian Red Cross was distributing limited aid. In this instance 
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the border remained open to other travelers, and just discriminated against these 100 or so 
African migrants, 1,439 individuals were detained by French authorities, and 1,079 were sent 
back. Colrat is also responsible for "tightening" security at the Nice train station (EuroNews, 
2015; Radio France Internationale, 2015). 
In fact, France can be considered one of the very first countries to defy EU regulation, when in 
2011, it stopped a train coming from Italy filled with African migrants, coming form Ventimiglia 
(Guardian, 2011). In this context, it is unsurprising the lack of humanity shown to African 
migrants by the French government in 2016. 
Not only are migrant’s being arrested, but French nationals have been arrested for transporting 
migrants. In this way, the French government seems to be using an approach similar to the Greek 
government – discouraging individuals from helping individuals; with threat/or actual arrest for 
people smuggling. This police activity began after France declared a state of emergency after the 
Charlie Hebdo in 2015 (Rippingale, 2017).  
Like Hungary, France has seen a rise in the far-right politically (DeSousa, 2016). The growing 
extreme right party in France is the Front National. In 2014, they won 21 of 74 seats in the 
local/supranational elections, and “358 of 1758 Regional Council Spots” (DeSousa, ch 3, 2016). 
However this rise of the French National Front is unlike the success found by the Hungarian 
Jobbik Party, as the National Front is not the ruling party nor does it compete with the ruling 
party, cannot introduce legislation, and has failed to push legislation which has affected the 
recognition rate (whereas the Jobbik party can be seen as a legitimate cause for Hungary’s zero 
percent recognition rate) (DeSousa, 2016). 
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The French State of Emergency declared after the events of Charlie Hebdo in 2015 is one of, if 
not the largest contributing factor to France’s police activity toward migrants. This “state of 
emergency” permits stop-and-frisk-style searches and allows French authorities to deport 
migrants back to Italy. This protocol also extends French jurisdiction of this authority 20 miles 
past the French border into places like Ventimiglia, Italy (Rippingale, 2017).  
France has also established special “outposts” – Police Aux Frontieres – at which French police 
deport migrants back to wherever they came; in violation of the Schengen Area (Rippingale, 
2017). 
One subtlety that must be pointed out; migrants from Africa tend to seek asylum in the European 
countries of their language (ex; those from Chad seek France, while Eritreans seek England), 
these also happen to be their colonizers. Eritreans in particular flea due to forced military service 
(at 15) and war (Rippingale, 2017).  
In order to enter and pass through France, migrants utilize the European train system. Trains 
from Milan to France, like the Menton station, are often patrolled by French police (Kingsley, 
2017). For those who can afford it, trains and hired cars may provide a safer and less 
cumbersome way to enter the country, as the French police are arresting and sending back 
migrants who they simply assume have previously been in Italy (Kingsley, 2017). Like Hungary, 
France has justified this behavior by invoking the Dublin Regulation.  
Not all (or even most) African migrants can afford the monetary cost nor the legal risk of the 
train systems, and therefore resort to walking. Some do so through the well-known region of 
Ventimiglia, Italy; however as these routes have become increasingly monitored by French 
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police, new routes spring up. Migrants who wish to avoid the French police have been taking an 
alternative route through the Alps (Sharp, 2018). This has resulted in over 1500 individuals 
choosing to undertake this dangerous and snowy route from about October 2017 – Jan 2018, 
though only about 12 reach France each day. This leaves aid workers to speculate that many 
Africans are dying along the way and will not be discovered till the snow thaws (Sharp, 2018).  
Though many refugees do seek asylum in France, it is by now notorious for its selective entry 
program and therefore it is often used as a throughway to Germany and/or Scandinavia from 
Italy. This path is not necessarily intuitive, as Switzerland/Austria is more of a direct route, 
however those wishing to avoid being fingerprinted by police in these less accommodating 
member states, will utilize the Western coast of France to Nice (Kingsley, 2017).  
Unlike the support found for refugees in Germany, the public opinion in France is more divided 
– though no where near the xenophobic levels found in Hungary. 55% of French are against 
Germany’s “unrestricted entry” though 69% are in favor of an EU-wide quota, which would 
ideally distribute the burden of refugees throughout Europe (DeSousa, ch 3, 2016).  
Similar to Greek civilians, French nationals have been helping aid refugees in terms of medical 
care, lodging and transportation, though French police continue to arrest these individuals for 
their charity. This is however, in contradiction with French law which states that it is not illegal 
to help foreigners, as long as you do not receive payment. There seems to be a discrepancy 
among the interpretation of the law, or deliberate ignorance (Kingsley, 2017). 
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Greece 
Contrary to France, the origins of most individuals migrating to/or through Greece via the 
Aegean are primarily Syrian (Kingsley, 2017; Otto and Steinhardt, 2017). The doorway to 
Greece comes in the form of the Islands of Lesvos or Kos, which is one option, along with 
Bulgaria, as a first leg of the Western Balkan Route (Kingsley, 2017; Kousoulis, Ioakeim-
Ioannidou & Economopoulos, 2017). However in order to get to Lesvos, migrants must walk the 
Western Turkish coast in order to reach Izmir, the Turkish “springboard” city, which sends 
migrants across the  Aegean Sea, in overcrowded inflatable boats (Kingsley, 2017,  ch 7). This 
ideally 20-30 minute trip is, while dangerous, much less so than the Mediterranean route from 
Libya or Egypt to Italy which can take days (Kingsley, 2017,  ch 7). Therefore immigrants 
reaching Greece are, for lack of a better phrase, in better shape, than those emerging the 
Mediterranean.  
This being said, the individuals arriving on Greek soil are still generally in very poor condition, 
which leaders of the far-right espouse will put undue stress on an already broken economy. By 
2015, four times the refugees were entering Greece, with thousands arriving daily (Kingsley, ch 
7, 2017). As Syrians discovered the Aegean Route, the Libya-Italy route became less and less 
popular.  
Like concerned citizens in France and Italy, certain Greek’s have been known to aid incoming 
refugees. They either aid them while coming onto shore, with medical care or food or 
transportation (Kingsley, 2017). However, this has become problematic for these Samaritans, as 
the Greek government has made much of this activity illegal. They have made it illegal to drive 
any migrants the 40-mile trek to the refugee intake center in Moira. They also threaten those who 
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aid migrants with arrest for people smuggling – not unlike measures taken in France. Adding to 
this problem, Greek politicians on the far-right encourage rhetoric which brands those to help 
refugees as a causal factor in their arrival. This results in xenophobic residents taking up 
initiative to intimidate and harass local “helpers” (Kingsley, ch 7, 2017).   
Far-right rhetoric within Greece mostly stems from the Golden Dawn. A party which was formed 
in the 80’s, but before 2012, gained no more than .05% of the legislative vote.  In June of 2012, 
the Golden Dawn gained 21 seats out of 300 – winning 7% of the vote (Sekeris and Vasilakis, 
2016). During this time, the Golden Dawn focused the Greek economic crisis within their far-
right message, resulting in another win in 2015 (6.3% of the vote) (Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016).  
On Kos, one of the primary islands of first entry to Greece for migrants crossing the Aegean 
from Turkey (along with Lesvos), the accommodations for refugees have been evaluated as 
dismal (Kingsley, 2017). The Mayor of Kos can be heard urging residents to withhold aid to 
migrants in the statement that migrants should not even be provided a cup of water – the most 
basic of necessities (Kingsley, 2017). While far-right rhetoric is present in Greece, the poor 
treatment and slow processing of refugees is largely due to insufficient resources within the 
Greek government – as Greece has recently faced a financial crisis, leaving it unequipped to 
accommodate migrants appropriately (Kingsley, 2017, ch 7). It is this slow processing that keeps 
Syrians, and other refugees detained in situations like the one documented in Kos – where it is 
reported that hundreds of individuals have been held without water or access to toilets for over a 
day, maybe more (Kingsley, 2017).  
Though Greece has been labeled restrictive, as far as individuals go, many have been 
documented willing to help. Among the population, much compassion is found for these 
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migrants who remind Greeks of their own ancestors, not long before (Kinglsey, 2017, ch 7). The 
disparity in actions of government and civilians in both Greece and France may point to a 
government who’s been stretched to the limit, looking for a way to burden share, very poorly. 
Broad observations at this point are that the lack burden sharing initiatives among EU states has 
left members like Italy and Greece completely helpless in the wake of the current refugee wave. 
Greece may be placed somewhere in the middle of Italy and Hungary, in terms of their treatment 
of refugees. 
UK 
The UK’s is possibly the most challenging country for migrants to enter of the five cases studied 
here. Similar to the US (but to a lesser extent), the UK’s island status provides a natural barrier 
with the rest of the EU – and migrants are forced to navigate French train systems to enter the 
UK. As discussed above in the French literature, this process has been made extremely difficult 
by French authorities and the tightening of security at French train stations (Kingsley, 2017).  
Out of destination European states of UK, France, Germany and Sweden, the UK takes in the 
smallest number of refugees. However, it is (along with the US) the “largest single-state bilateral 
contributor of humanitarian aid for the Syrian crisis” (Ostrand, 2015, pg. 5). This contribution 
however does not necessarily replace their lack of willingness to accept refugees however, as 1. 
one cannot buy off the problem of migration, and 2. While the UK is the largest European donor; 
Germany, the top receiving country, is also a top contributor (Ostrand, 2015, pg. 15); along with 
Sweden (also one of the top receiving countries) (Hoel, 2015). Similar to the United States, the 
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United Kingdom has not specified a specific number of migrants which it promises to resettle 
(Ostrand, 2015, pg. 15). 
The UK does not have a resettlement program. It has however “it introduced a vulnerable 
persons relocation scheme in January 2014 for “particularly vulnerable” Syrians” (Ostrand, 
2015). An issue with this program is the vague phrase of “particularly vulnerable”. This program 
has granted humanitarian status to 143 Syrian asylum seekers, and plans to help several hundred 
more over the next three years – though again, “several hundred” is a vague statement (Ostrand, 
2015, pg. 15).   
In terms of anti-immigration rhetoric in the UK, the far-right party UKIP was particularly vocal 
in championing Brexit, the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union (Sampson, 2017). 
UKIP came to prominence in 1998, and campaigned heavily against immigration as early as 
2000 (Ford & Goodwin, 2017). However it has taken them a decade to gain the momentum 
necessary (and the legislative seats) to achieve their ultimate goal of leaving the European Union 
(Ford & Goodwin, 2017). While migration did not cause Brexit, the issue of immigration within 
the Brexit discussion became fused during migration crisis. Leaving the EU would change many 
aspects of the UK’s economic relationship with the rest of Europe, but many far-right politicians 
primarily spewed rhetoric on the “dangers of immigration” and closing the UK’s open borders 
which are required by the EU’s Schengen Agreement. To be fair, many politicians 
espoused concerns about the UK carrying weaker states (an age-old argument of economics), 
many argued that getting out of the Schengen Area was essential national security (Sampson, 
2017). 
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The results of the Brexit referendum shocked many. Though historically, the UK has had a 
contentious relationship with the EU since it reluctantly joined in the 1960’s after the failure of 
EFTA, its own attempt at an economic union. Only after the demise of it’s imperial status 
became painfully clear, and the establishment of its counter institution, EFTA, was only 
moderately successful in comparison, did the UK begin to consider the investing in the EU. EU 
member financial contributions are progressive. As one of the wealthiest nations, the UK ends up 
supplementing poorer nations within the EU – (which has been the basis of the economic 
argument to Brexit). Since then the 60’s, UK has cooperated with varying levels of 
Euroscepticism never too far below the surface (Olsen & McCormick, 2017). 
So why Brexit now? This cannot entirely be known. Contributing however was a shift in UK’s 
“class structure” contributed which to the rise in conservatism. As the population shifted from 
primarily working class (Labor supporters) to college graduates (Conservative supporters), there 
was a shift in base populations (Ford & Goodwin, 2017).  
Another contribution which set the stage for Brexit was the Labor Parties inadequacies to 
incorporate “left-behind”, white, lower class individuals, which shifted their support to UKIP 
over the last ten years; along with growing identity crisis as ethnic cleavages have expanded 
(Ford & Goodwin, 2017).   
The UK’s referendum to leave the European Union took place on June 23, 2016 – passing with a 
narrow margin. Just 52% of the population voted to leave the EU (Ford & Goodwin, 2017; 
Sampson, 2017), presumably leaving nearly half of the nation unrepresented in this decision. 
Obvious implications of Brexit are economic and potentially disastrous, but due to the EU’s 
Schengen Area (which allows for the free movement of people), the referendum cannot really be 
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separated from a piece of immigration policy – as this referendum essentially changes their 
border policy. In relation to Brexit, it must be noted that anti-immigration policies have emerged 
over the past 10-15 years in the UK, before the recent success of UKIP. This 10-15 year 
escalation in far-right influence can be traced through a number of policies which have 
negatively affected the status, livelihood and accommodations of and for refugees in the UK 
(Stewart & Mulvey, 2014).  
INCREASED FAR-RIGHT VOTING IN EUROPE 
The five cases discussed above indicate that support for the far-right declined following World 
War II, but has displayed a creeping increase since the late 70’s (Betz, 1994). The decrease in 
support for the far-right post WWII has been attributed to increased social and political stability 
in Europe, with the development of institutions like the European Union – creating welfare states 
which increased the wellbeing of individuals across Europe, leaving little room for extremist 
ideology (Betz, 1994). However when the European financial scene began to destabilize in the 
70s, far-right voting began to increase in Western Europe – beginning in Austria (Betz, 1993). 
By the 90s, with increased migration and continued financial instability, the far-right gained a 
clear presence in the European political scene (Roodujin, 2015).  
One theory attributes the recent success of the far-right to increased globalization (Roodujin, 
2015). This theory proposes that as trade has increased, this has created “winners” and “losers” 
in the global market, and these “losers” gravitate toward a far-right philosophy in order to 
remove themselves from globalization (as if this were possible), by encouraging nationalism, to 
in their minds, protect national interests (Betz, 1993; Roodujin, 2015). 
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Another theory about the recent success of the far-right cites electoral volatility, meaning that 
voters have become less brand loyal (Roodujin, 2015). In the past voters were less likely to 
switch parties from election to election. This phenomenon has been witnessed recently and has 
been attributed to increased individualism and to increased distrust in institutions, as these 
institutions  have been unable to meet the needs of a society (Betz, 1993; Roodujin, 2015). 
As the far-right has regained its strength, it has been careful to separate itself from its fascist and 
Nazi ancestors, and has attempted to “detoxify” their image. This has been especially crucial for 
the success of the RPR (Roodujin, 2015, pg. 8). Due to the probability of continued migration, 
the Radical Populist Right will likely continue to be relevant, as immigration has proven to be a 
central (if not the most important) issue for those who vote radical populist right (Roodujin, 
2015). 
An additional framework from which to view the recent rise in the far-right, is through the 
activity of more traditional, stable parties (Roodujin, 2015). Extreme right wing parties (or third 
parties in general) have had the opportunity to flourish when the established center-left and 
center-right parties become very moderate in their beliefs and rhetoric in an attempt to 
encompass the beliefs of the masses (Roodujin, 2015). This has created political “space” for the 
far-right to pick up more extreme ideological issues, which still matter very much to the 
population (Roodujin, 2015). 
Ethnic nationalism (which is tied to far-right voting) does vary across Europe (Lubbers and 
Coenders, 2017), so while far-right parties have gained seats in legislations across Europe – their 
success has been varied. In an analysis of 20 European Countries, and their parties, and said 
party share as of 2008, we can see that there is quite a bit of variation among European countries, 
32 
 
with the Switzerland’s Swiss Peoples Party and Austria’s Austrian Freedom Party at 21.0 and 
18.7 shares of votes respectively; while Germany’s National Democratic Party of Germany 
(NDP) rests at 2.1 shares of votes (Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). Though these numbers have 
obviously changed in the past 10 years – for example Hungary’s JOBBIK party was placed at 3.1 
shares of the vote (just above Germany), a number which has drastically increased, as the 
political influence JOBBIK has increased. Their success has been thought to push Hungary’s 
ruling (far-right) party Fidesz further right, resulting in Hungary’s restrictive reaction to the 
Syrian Crisis. These numbers are valuable in understanding recent far-right voting as part of the 
larger picture of far-right voting across Europe. 
MIGRATION CRISIS PUSH FACTORS 
Whether one considers the Arab Spring as a causal factor in the current migration crisis is a 
matter of perspective. From the perspective of the generations of individuals fleeing decades of 
continued conflict in the MENA regions, the Arab Spring can be viewed as an accelerator to a 
preexisting crisis; as migration from Libya to Italy is really an age-old tale (Kingsley, 2017). 
However, from the perspective of Europeans, migration became a crisis shortly after the 2011 
Arab Spring, and therefore this event may be seen as a cause of the current crisis. Looking 
further back, another cause may be the current destabilization in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, 
rooted in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq (Kingsley, 2017).  
A slew of factors fall under the umbrella of European political causes. Since needy boats and feet 
have reached its soil en masse in 2014, both individual EU member states and EU as a whole 
have erected a variety of obstacles to individuals seeking shelter and prosperity in Europe. These 
include: inhumane detention across Europe, razor-wire fences, reduction in aid to Mediterranean 
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rescue, lackluster resettlement programs, and xenophobic rhetoric by political leaders (Hoel, 
2015; Kelliher, 2016; Kingsley, 2017). Had Europe acted differently in the early stages of the 
2014-2015 migration surge, it is likely that the ferocity of this continued humanitarian crisis 
could be mitigated (Kingsley, 2017).  
HYPOTHESIS 1 
It is believed and supported by the literature that voters of the far-right ideology hold an anti-
immigration stance, due to the central nature of ethnic nativism in far-right ideals. Therefore I 
hypothesize that as migration increases, that voters with a nativist/far-right ideology would be 
mobilized to vote – increasing support for the far-right.  
H(0) – No correlation will be found between an increase in migration and an increase in far-right 
voting.  
H(A) – A correlation will be found between an increase in migration and an increase in far-right 
voting.  
HYPOTHESIS 2 
Far-right ideology seeks to preserve not only national culture but the natural population and 
ethnicity. Instances of racism and discrimination in France, Greece and Hungary against 
migrants coming from the MENA area due to ethnicity and religion lead to a second hypothesis 
which states; as migration of individuals from the MENA area (those affected by the migration 
crisis) increases, support for the far-right will increase.  
H(0) – No correlation will be found between an increase in migration of individuals from the 
MENA region (affected by the migration crisis) and an increase in far-right voting.  
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H(A) – A correlation will be found between an increase in migration of individuals from the 
MENA region (affected by the migration crisis) and an increase in far-right voting. 
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METHODS 
This small-N study will consist of five case studies of Hungary, Germany, France, Greece and 
the UK. These five studies will explore the relationship between the current migration crisis and 
far-right voting in Europe, utilizing data from The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and Adam 
Carr’s Electoral Database. In these studies, correlation experiments will be attempted in order to 
indicate whether these variables fall under an umbrella of potential causes of far-right voting. A 
P-value of .1 has been set to determine the significance of these results; and variables will be 
considered associated if found to have a correlation coefficient greater than or equal to .5 (or less 
than -.5, only in the case of the control variable of GDP). It must be said however, that these 
correlation experiments do not determine causation.  
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable of far-right voting has been operationalized as the percentage vote share 
that has gone to far-right parties in a single legislative election, for each of the five case studies 
being explored. This variable will be obtained by dividing the number of votes cast to far-right 
parties by the total number of votes cast in a single legislative election.  
The reasoning for utilizing “vote shares” as opposed to “number of parliamentary seats” or 
“percentage of parliamentary seats” to describe far-right voting in this study is because not all 
nations convert the percentage of the vote gained by a party into parliamentary seats in the same 
way. Many require a threshold which could mask the support given so some far-right parties. By 
choosing to represent far-right voting in percentage of the legislative vote, we can be more 
certain that this study describes the percentage of the voting population voting far-right.  
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In each experiment the x (asylum applications) and y (far-right vote share) values have been 
staggered by one year, as to see the possible effect of asylum applications on the following years 
elections. These experiments have been divided into “A” and “B” experiments, which examine 
(A) the role that migration plays over an entire election cycle, and (B) in the single year leading 
up to a legislative election. In both “A” and “B” experiments the dependent “y” variable of far-
right vote shares in a single legislative election remains consistent.  
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variable of migration has been operationalized as asylum applications to each 
of the five case studies, both in totality (1) which will test hypothesis 1, and of selected 
nationalities which have been identified by the literature as victims of the refugee crisis (2) 
which will test hypothesis 2. Once asylum applications have been gathered for each data subset 
per year, each will provide data points for two independent variables, one which represents 
migration over an election cycle (which will be known as “A” experiments), and one which 
represents recent migration, defined later in the paper, (which will be called “B” experiments).  
Asylum applications have been chosen to operationalize the variable of migration for several 
reasons. One reason for choosing this representation is that an individual must physically be in a 
country to apply for asylum there, therefore we can assume that the number of applications will 
somewhat accurately represent at a portion of individuals which have been witnessed by voters 
entering a country. Number of applications has been chosen over the number of individuals 
which have been offered residency as the number of individuals offered residency status is often 
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only a small fraction of the individuals which enter a country. Therefore “border crossings” may 
seem an accurate representation of migration, however the number of individuals who cross over 
into a country is not well documented, in some cases migrants are specifically trying not to be 
detected for fear of being sent back to the previous country, therefore asylum applications are a 
much more well documented source for migration.  
The discrepancy between asylum seekers and the number of migrants reported by each country is 
a valid concern, but unfortunately not one that may be addressed by this study. For example, the 
International Organization for Migration does not begin reporting migrant arrivals until 2015, 
four years after the beginning of the migration crisis – and even then, only by Italy and Greece. 
Because this study begins to look at how the arrival of migrants effects far-right voting as early 
as the beginning of the crisis in 2011, a more well documented source is necessary. For example, 
in the year 2015 Greece received 10,861 asylum applications, though the IOM reported 847,890 
migrants arriving in Greece. It is clear that asylum applications do not document all individuals 
who pass through a country, as many of these migrants are in and out of Greece within a few 
days if allowed. Though they do represent the portion of the population which spends an 
extended amount of time within a country. 
CONTROL VARIABLES  
The following control variables may influence extreme right wing voting besides immigration.  
As shown in the literature review above, factors of financial stability, unemployment, and the 
fear that accompanies security concerns such as acts of terrorism have been known to affect 
voting habits (Berrebi & Klor, 2006; Hart, 2018; Kibris, 2011; Trein, Beckmann & Walter, 
2017). In the following experiments the financial stability of a nation has been operationalized as 
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GDP per capita in current (2018) US dollars. Unemployment has simply been operationalized as 
the unemployment rate in percentage of a workforce which are unemployed. Security concerns 
have been operationalized as the number of incidents of terrorism within a country in a year. 
GDP and unemployment rates have been sourced from the World Bank Database, while the 
START Global Terrorism Database has been utilized to gather incidents of terrorism for each 
case study. 
The non-material variables of national pride, xenophobia and European identity prove difficult to 
operationalize, and are recorded less frequently and broadly then the material variables of GDP, 
unemployment and acts of terrorism, though no less important. Due to these factors, these 
variables have been omitted from this study with the recognition that they may very well be 
alternative potential causes of the far-right voting in. Future studies should attempt to find 
reliable data on these variables which have the ability to cover all five case studies and include 
them as additional control variables. 
A EXPERIMENTS 
A experiments will utilize an x value which consists of asylum applications which span an 
average election cycle. In these experiments, asylum applications have been added to create a 
new x value which consists of the sum of asylum applications over the four years leading up to 
an election. A four-year period has been selected as this is the average time span between 
legislative elections for the five countries being studied. A experiments explore both total asylum 
applications over a four year period (labeled as A-1) and for selected nationalities (labeled as A-
2).  
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B EXPERIMENTS  
B experiments will utilize an x value which represents of the number asylum applications that a 
country received in a single year prior to a legislative election. Like A experiments, B 
experiments explore both total asylum applications over a single year period (B-1) and 
applications from selected nationalities over a single year period (B-2). This second set of 
experiments which look at recent migration as opposed to migration over an election cycle have 
been implemented to account for the arbitrary timing of any election in a wave of migration and 
the volatile nature of voting habits. This reasoning is similar to why the control variables of GDP 
and Unemployment only consider a single year prior to an election as opposed to GDP or 
Unemployment over an election cycle. Suppose a legislative election is held in 2017, two years 
after the peak of the migration crisis. If we only consider migration over an election cycle, these 
peak migration numbers will be included in the x value, though it is possible that a massive 
number of migrating individuals may not be witnessed by voters in nearly two years. With this in 
mind, I believe it is important to consider how recent migration may affect far-right voting 
habits.  
C EXPERIMENTS  
C experiments examine the effect that a change in GDP may have on far-right voting habits in 
the five cases being studied. These experiments utilize an x value, called CV1, which consists of 
GDP in current US dollars for the single year before a legislative election and a y value of the 
dependent variable (electoral shares of far-right parties). Where all other experiments seek a 
correlation coefficient greater than .5 to determine to which degree these variables are 
associated, because a decrease in GDP is expected to increase far-right voting, the variable of 
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GDP will be considered associated with the DV at -.5. Like B experiments, C experiments only 
look at a countries GDP in the single year prior to an election. The reasoning behind this choice 
is simply that individuals who vote in an election are not likely to care if their country was stable 
three years ago, if it is currently unstable, and therefore adding four years of GDP to create a 
variable of GDP over an election cycle may not be representative of the actual financial 
circumstance that voters are in when they cast their vote.   
D EXPERIMENTS 
D experiments utilize a nation’s unemployment rate to determine the effect that unemployment 
may have on far-right voting habits. Unlike GDP, which measures the financial status of a 
country, the unemployment rate may shed light on the percentage of individuals who are feeling 
disenfranchised – a known contributor to populist   and far-right voting. Like B and C 
experiments, D experiments utilize an x value (CV2) of the percentage of unemployment rate for 
the year prior to an election, and a y value of the dependent variable (electoral shares of far-right 
parties). The reasoning behind the choice to only look at the prior years’ unemployment rate is 
very similar to why this study only examines the GDP of a single year before an election. For 
example, if the unemployment rate is relatively low, but then spikes right before an election, it is 
likely that large numbers of recently unemployed individuals will not be thinking of their prior 
financial situation, but rather their current diminished financial situation when voting. 
E EXPERIMENTS 
E experiments consider how the number of terrorist attacks that a nation experiences in a year 
may affect far-right voting. Acts of terrorism undoubtedly affect a nation’s immigration policy. 
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We have seen examples of this in various European states (specifically France and the UK) and 
within the United States. The tightening of immigration policy directly aligns with the objectives 
of far-right parties, therefore it is important to consider whether acts of terrorism affect voting 
habits for the far-right. In order to explore this relationship, number of terrorist attacks over an 
election cycle (CV3-A) and number of attacks in the year prior to an election (CV3-B) are both 
utilized as x values, while the dependent variable (x value) of electoral shares gained by far-right 
parties remains constant for each case study.iii
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DATA 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Data points for the dependent variable consist of vote shares (in percent of the total vote) for far-
right parties. These vote shares have been gathered from Adam Carr’s Electoral Database, which 
provides electoral results for legislative elections for the following case studies (Hungary, 
Germany, France, Greece and the UK) among others.  
For each case study, I looked at each legislative election which occurred after the start of the 
migration crisis in 2011, in addition to the legislative election which preceded the crisis, in order 
to determine a frame of reference as to what far-right vote shares looked like before the crisis 
began. For each election, all participating parties were researched in order to determine which 
parties identified as far-right. The following table displays these parties, the number of votes they 
received out of the total votes during that election year, and the % of the total vote which each 
party gained.  
Table 1: Far-Right European Parties: 2009-Present 
Year Country Party name # of votes total votes 
% of 
vote 
2010 Hungary FIDESz  2,706,292 5,132,531 53% 
2010 Hungary Jobbik  855,436 5,132,531 17% 
2014 Hungary FIDESz-MPSz 2,135,960 4,795,757 45% 
2014 Hungary Jobbik  985,028 4,795,757 21% 
2018 Hungary FIDESz-MPSz-KDN  2,824,551 5,723,283 49% 
2018 Hungary Jobbik  1,092,801 5,723,283 19% 
2009 Germany N/A 0 43,371,190 0% 
2013 Germany AfD 2,056,985 43,726,856 5% 
2017 Germany AfD 5,877,094 46,506,857 13% 
2007 France National Front 17,107 20,406,785 0% 
2012 France National Front 3,528,663 25,952,859 14% 
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2017 France National Front 1,590,858 18,176,177 9% 
2017 France DLF 17,344 18,176,177 0% 
2009 Greece LAOS 383,851 6,822,890 6% 
2012 Greece 
Independent 
Greeks 462,441 6,155,256 8% 
2012 Greece Golden Dawn 425,970 6,155,256 7% 
2015 Greece 
Independent 
Greeks 200,432 5,431,850 4% 
2015 Greece Golden Dawn 379,581 5,431,850 7% 
2010 UK UKIP 917,832 29,653,638 3% 
2015 UK UKIP 3,881,099 30,732,453 13% 
2017 UK UKIP 593,852 32,196,918 2% 
 
 
Carr’s database provides the percent of the total vote that each party won during each election. 
For each election, percent vote shares of the far-right parties which were identified were added to 
create a total percent of far-right support for each election to create the dependent variable data 
points. The following figure shows the percentage of the legislative vote that went to far-right 
parties in each case study, per year. 
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Figure 1: Far-Right Legislative Vote Shares (DV) 
 
In the case of Greece for the 2012 and 2015 elections two data points are available; as in both 
years two elections were held due to the failure to produce a successful governing alliance with 
the results of the first election. In these cases, the second, successful, election was utilized to 
create the data point for that year.  
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Data points for the independent variables consist of asylum applications to each of the five 
countries being studied, retrieved from the United Nations Refugee Agency Database. Figure 1, 
below, shows total asylum applications to each of the five countries beginning in 2001, labeled 
as Independent Variable 1 (IV1). 
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Figure 2: Total Asylum Applications (IV1) 
 
According to the literature (Kingsley, 2017; Park; 2015) nationalities coming primarily from the 
Middle East and northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa have been identified as victims of the 
refugee crisis. In order to see how the immigration of these affected groups may have impacted 
far-right wing voting in particular, applications from these selected nationalities, labeled as 
Independent Variable 2 (IV2), were gathered in Figure 2 below.  
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Figure 3: Applications of Selected Nationalities (IV2) 
 
Two data points were then created from both IV1 (total applications) and IV2 (selected 
applications). For each subset of data (IV1 and IV2), one datapoint was created by summing the 
four years of asylum applications prior to an election in each case study to represent migration 
over an election cycle. These data points participate in “A” experiments and constitute points 
IV1-A and IV2-A. For example, in order to obtain data points for Hungary’s 2010 election, 
applications for the years 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 were added for both total and selected 
asylum applications, to create the 2010 IV1-A and IV2-A data points.  
While A experiments consider migration over an average election cycle, B experiments consider 
how recent migration may affect far-right wing voting in a single legislative election utilizing the 
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data subsets IV1 and IV2. Using the same example of Hungary’s 2010 election, to represent 
migration in the year prior to this election, total and selected applications for 2009 were gathered 
to create the 2010 IV1-B and IV2-B data points.  
Control Variable 1 – GDP 
Data points for GDP per capita (CV1) have been collected from the World Bank database, and 
measured in current (2018) US dollars, for each country of study. CV1 constitutes the x values 
for C experiments. The figure below displays this data for the years 2000 to 2017. This control 
variable, among others, serves a possible alternative economic explanation for changes in far-
right voting. A strong negative correlation would be intuitive based on the conventional wisdom 
that economically disadvantaged voters are a large portion of the far-right base, meaning that as 
GDP decreases, far-right vote shares would increase. In this case, the variable of GDP will be 
considered associated at a correlation coefficient of -.5 or less. 
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Figure 4: GDP per Capita (CV1) 
 
Control Variable 2 – Unemployment  
Data points for unemployment (CV2) were gathered from the World Bank database. 
Unemployment is measured in percentage of the population which is not employed but wished to 
be working. Unemployment rates have been collected for each of the five case studies for the 
years 2000 to 2017. CV2 constitutes the x value for D experiments and the following figure 
displays this data.  
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Figure 5: Unemployment Rates (CV2) 
 
Control Variable 3 – Acts of Terrorism  
In order to determine the potential influence of security concerns on far-right vote shares, 
instances of terrorist attacks have been gathered from the START, Global Terrorism Database, 
for the years 2000 to 2017 for each of the five case studies. The following figure displays this 
data. Unlike C and D experiments which look only at the year prior to a legislative election, E 
experiments look at how terrorist attacks over an election cycle (CV3-A) and in the single year 
prior to an election may affect far-right voting (CV3-B). While financial circumstance may 
improve, leaving a voter in an immediately better or worse circumstance than the year before, 
terrorism thrives on lingering fears. This is why this study looks at the potential effects of both 
terrorism over an election cycle and recent attacks.  
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Figure 6: Incidents of Terrorist Attacks (CV3) 
 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
The following tables show how dependent and independent variables were organized for analysis 
in each case study along with the results of their correlation experiments, where “r” represents 
the correlation coefficient and the years indicated are the years in which legislative elections 
were held in each nation. These tables also include control variables, along with their correlation 
experiment results and p-value findings.  
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Table 2: Hungary Results 
Year IV1-A IV2-A IV1-B IV2-B CV1 CV2 CV3-A CV3-B DV 
2010 11,770 2,430 4,287 1,387 13,029.88 10.03 3 1 69.39 
2014 23,320 8,946 18,122 6,072 13,667.70 10.18 0 0 65.07 
2018 246,085 164,153 3,239 2,964 14,224.85 4.33 3 0 68.33 
r 0.24 0.25 -0.96 -1.00 -0.27 -0.30 0.97 0.69  
P-value 0.85 0.84 0.19 0.06 0.82 0.80 0.15 0.52  
 
Table 3: German Results 
Year IV1-A IV2-A IV1-B IV2-B CV1 CV2 CV3-A CV3-B DV 
2009 84,957 31,566 20,701 10,807 45,699.20 7.52 13 3 0 
2013 176,533 79,897 63,928 25,856 44,065.25 5.38 17 5 4.7 
2017 1,444,652 945,980 721,778 559,938 42,232.57 4.12 122 44 12.63 
r 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 -0.99 -0.96 0.94 0.94  
P-value 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.21  
 
Table 4: France Results 
Year IV1-A IV2-A IV1-B IV2-B CV1 CV2 CV3-A CV3-B DV 
2007 194,901 47,392 30,048 8,837 36,442.62 8.45 112 34 0.08 
2012 174,426 61,903 51,398 18,388 43,790.74 8.81 33 8 13.59 
2017 261,270 122,877 70,240 38,600 36,870.22 10.06 95 26 8.84 
r -0.06 0.34 0.67 0.47 0.80 0.37 -0.88 -0.93  
P-value 0.96 0.78 0.54 0.69 0.41 0.76 0.31 0.25  
 
Table 5: Greece Results 
Year IV1-A IV2-A IV1-B IV2-B CV1 CV2 CV3-A CV3-B DV 
2009 65,955 22,561 19,421 6,881 31,997.28 7.76 96 53 5.62 
2012 53,399 17,407 8,762 2,762 25,916.29 17.86 227 11 14.43 
2015 34,466 17,306 8,875 4,459 21,760.98 26.49 113 26 10.67 
r -0.47 -0.90 -0.91 -1.00 -0.66 0.61 0.88 -1.00  
P-value 0.69 0.29 0.27 0.01 0.54 0.58 0.31 0.05  
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Table 6: UK Results 
Year IV1-A IV2-A IV1-B IV2-B CV1 CV2 CV3-A CV-B DV 
2010 112,744 65,697 28,963 18,017 38,262.18 7.54 88 39 3.09 
2015 111,843 45,660 31,377 14,878 46,783.47 6.11 341 103 12.62 
2017 136,655 63,116 37,370 16,218 40,412.03 4.81 369 15 1.84 
r -0.61 -0.97 -0.34 -0.76 0.94 0.08 0.32 0.99  
P-value 0.58 0.14 0.78 0.45 0.22 0.95 0.79 0.10  
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FINDINGS 
When viewing the results of correlation tests between IV1-A and the DV, IV1-B and the DV, 
IV2-A and the DV and IV2-B and the DV in totality, without regard to country, each shows a 
slight negative correlation. A possible explanation can be a general low level in support for far-
right parties in the nations which received the most asylum applications, like Germany, France 
and the UK, in comparison to generally high levels of support for the far-right, in nations which 
received comparatively less asylum applications, like Hungary and Greece. However, when 
looking at each case study individually different patterns emerge. It must be said however, that 
the following correlation results do not determine causation, but rather illuminates possible 
causes of far-right voting in Europe. These results may only - indicate association of variables.  
P-values found in this study are relatively high, possibly due to the very small n. Therefore this 
study cannot reject the null hypothesis and focusses this Findings section on the interpretation of 
association found between possible causal variables (IV’s) and the dependent variable.  
HUNGARY 
In Hungary there are two parties which have been identified as belonging to the far-right; 
FIDESz (the ruling party) and JOBBIK, a party which entered Hungary’s political scene in 2010. 
JOBBIK lies even further right on the political spectrum, and competes with FIDESz for the far-
right constituency. Together these parties have constituted 25% in 2006, 40% in 2010, 50% in 
2014 and 33.33% of the total ballot. This indicates that far-right parties are on the rise in 
Hungary. These percentages also indicate a generally strong presence of far-right parties, in 
comparison to other cases in this study.  
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In the case of Hungary, A experiments look at how a sum of asylum applications over four years 
(the average length of an election cycle in these case studies) effects far-right voting in a single 
election. Results show a weak positive correlation for both total asylum applications at 0.24 with 
a p-value of .85; and for selected nationalities at 0.25 with a p-value of .84. Correlation 
coefficients show no evidence to support Alternative Hypothesis 1 or 2, indicating that over an 
election cycle an increase in asylum applications in totality or of specific victims of the 
migration crisis, does not associate with an increase in far-right voting. P-values do not fall under 
.1 and do not allow the rejection of the Null Hypotheses. 
B experiments, which observe how the single year’s applications prior to an election effect far-
right voting show a strong negative correlation for total applications at -0.96 with a p-value of 
.19; and for selected applications at -1, with a p-value of .06. Therefore, in terms of recent 
migration, correlation coefficients do not produce association and Null Hypothesis 1 and 2 are 
not rejected. It appears that in this case study there is little evidence to support the notion that an 
increase in migration has any effect on an increase in far-right votes.  
Shortcomings in the analysis of Hungary in particular reside in the operationalization of 
migration in asylum applications. It has been well documented in the literature that Hungary is a 
country which most migrants wish to pass through to reach countries which offer a more 
hospitable resettlement program, therefore we must assume, especially in the case of Hungary, 
that asylum applications only represent a portion of individuals which travel through Hungary. 
However, these correlation experiments are still relevant. Hungary does show a spike in asylum 
applications in 2015, the documented peak of the migration crisis, and following this a decrease 
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in far-right voting. Therefore if the number of individuals was increased by a perfect 
representation of migration, the negative correlation found may very well be even stronger.   
Control variable 1, which tests the impact of GDP per capita on far-right voting produces a weak 
negative correlation (-.27), with a p-value of .82. Correlation results indicate that change in GDP 
has little impact on far-right voting in Hungary. Like GDP, the second control variable of 
unemployment (CV2) produces a weak negative correlation of -.30 with a p-value of .8, 
indicating that changes in the unemployment rate cannot be proven to have an effect on far right 
voting in Hungary. However, control variable 3-A and 3-B which measures (A) the impact of 
terrorist attacks over an election cycle and (B) in the single year prior to an election on far-right 
voting do produce strong positive correlation coefficients of significance (at .97 and .69) with p-
values of .15 and .52, indicating that as acts of terrorism increase, so does far-right voting. 
However these results of significance must be taken with a grain of salt. Hungary, unlike the 
other cases being studied, witnesses an extremely low number of terrorist incidents – the most 
over an election cycle being 3, whereas all other cases at some point experience attacks in the 
triple digits over an election cycle. Therefore, either this correlation may be a coincidence or 
Hungarians are extremely sensitive to acts of terrorism. 
GERMANY 
Germany did not see the emergence of a far-right party until 2013 when the Alternative for 
Deutschland (AfD) entered the German Parliament, therefore this is the only party which has 
been identified as far-right in the German case study. In terms of ballot composition, far-right 
parties consisted of 0% in 2005 and 2009, 11.1% in 2013, and 12.5% in 2017. Therefore, we can 
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see that while the presence of far-right parties in Germany has increased, they constitute a 
relatively small portion of the ballot. These numbers also show that Germany does not have a 
long history of far-right party presence in the legislature.  
In the case study of Germany, A experiments show a strong positive correlation between far-
right voting and total applications at 0.95, with a p-value of .2; and for the applications of 
selected nationalities at 0.95, with a p-value of .21. While correlation experiments show 
association, due to p-values, the Null Hypotheses cannot be rejected. The correlation coefficient 
indicates that an increase in migration in total and of individuals identified as being victims of 
the migration crisis over an election cycle correlates with an increase in support for far-right 
parties in Germany.  
German B experiments also show a strong positive correlation between total applications and 
far-right voting at 0.95, with a p-value of .2 and for selected nationalities and an increase in far-
right voting at 0.94, with a p-value of .22. In these experiments, strong positive correlation 
results can be interpreted to mean that migration immediately preceding an election both in total 
and of selected nationalities can be associated with an increase in far-right voting. 
Unlike Hungary, Germany has been viewed by migrants as one of, if not the, ideal destination 
country due to its massive resettlement program (only being surpassed by Sweden), and general 
accommodating attitude. Therefore, in the case of Germany utilizing asylum applications as a 
representation of migration is likely very accurate.  
In the case of Germany, C experiments which test CV1 (GDP per capita) and the DV (far-right 
vote shares) produce a very strong negative correlation of significance at -.99%, with a p-value 
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of .07. This indicates that as GDP decreases, far-right voting increases – therefore GDP per 
capita can be cannot be discounted as a cause of far-right voting in Germany. Like CV1, CV2 of 
unemployment when tested with the DV produces another strong negative correlation coefficient 
of significance at -.96 with a p-value of .19. This disassociation indicates that as the 
unemployment rate decreases far-right voting increases. However unlike the German C 
experiments, the result of German D experiments are counter intuitive to what one would expect, 
as the more people that are employed the more votes the far-right receives. The German E 
experiments which consider how acts of terrorism may affect far-right voting both over an 
election cycle (CV3-A) and in the year prior to an election (CV3-B) both produce a strong, 
positive correlation coefficient of significance at .94 with p-values of .21. Association found in 
correlation results indicate that as acts of terrorism increase, so does support for the far-right. 
FRANCE 
In France, far-right parties which have been identified for study are the National Front and 
Debout la France (DLF). The National Front is by far the most prominent far-right party, while 
DLF has existed for some time, only began to pull noticeable support in 2017. Far-right parties 
have constituted 11.1% in 2007, 10% in 2012, and 20% in 2017 (with the entrance of the DLF) 
of the French legislative ballot. While France does show a history of far-right parties, like 
Germany, there presence is modest in comparison to those of Hungary or Greece.  
In the case study of France, A experiments show a very weak negative correlation between a sum 
of total asylum applications per election cycle and far-right voting at -0.06, with a p-value of .96; 
however selected applications over an election cycle shows a medium strength, positive 
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correlation at 0.34 with far-right voting, with a p-value of .78. These results do not meet the 
standards for significance at .5, and therefore the Null Hypothesis cannot be rejected. However 
these findings are somewhat interesting, as they differ so greatly from the results of experiment 
1A. The results of A experiments indicate that there may be some difference in the impact of 
selected nationalities and that of migration as a total on far-right voting behavior over an election 
cycle. 
B experiments show a significate positive correlation between total applications from a single 
year and far-right voting at 0.67, with a p-value of .54; and a nearly significant correlation 
between selected applications for a single year and far-right voting at 0.47, with a p-value of .69. 
While positive association is found, p-values do not allow the rejection of the Null hypotheses.  
This indicates that an increase in both total and selected applications in a single year prior to and 
election is associated with an increase in far-right voting. Because these results differ so greatly 
from that of A experiments, I am inclined to believe that recent migration of individuals may 
have a greater effect on far-right voting in France, that that of migration over an election cycle. 
French C experiments (testing the effects GDP per capita on the DV) produce a strong positive 
correlation coefficient of .80 with a p-value of .41. This result is counter intuitive to an economic 
theory of voting. This means that as GDP per capita rises (indicating more financial stability), so 
does the support for the far-right similar to the results of German D experiments. It is a notable 
observation that far-right voting is associated with unemployment but not GDP, as both are 
economic indicators. Results of French D experiments which test how the unemployment rate 
may effect French support for the far-right. This experiment produces a weak positive result 
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which does not meet the standard of significance at .37, with a p-value of .76. Therefore the 
unemployment rate is rejected as possible factor for French far-right support. 
E experiments test the possible effect of terrorist incidents on far-right voting over an election 
cycle (CV3-A) and in the year prior to an election (CV3-B) and produce strong negative 
correlation coefficients of -.88 and -.93, with p-values of .31 and .25, respectively. Correlation 
results show that as acts of terrorism decrease, support for the far-right increases. This result is 
very interesting as it is covered in the literature review that much of French anti-immigration 
actions stem from the “state of emergency” that was declared after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. 
Though I must point out that a state of emergency is declared by the executive, and not a 
legislative matter, therefore not necessarily supported by the civilian population by far-right 
support. 
GREECE 
Greece has both a history of the presence of far-right parties and much volatility in the success of 
these parties. In Greece the parties LAOS, the Independent Greeks and the Golden Dawn have 
been identified as belonging to the far-right. LAOS was the primary far-right party until the June 
election of 2012, in which it failed to make the ballot. The Golden Dawn did not gain noticeable 
support until Greece’s May 2012 election, however by January of 2015 had become the leading 
far-right party. The Independent Greeks have been identified as far-right due to their nationalist 
and populist rhetoric and like the Golden Dawn, did not enter the ballot until the June 2012 
legislative elections. While they initially attracted more supporters than the Golden Dawn, this 
advantage decreased by 2015.  Far-right parties have constituted 20% in 2007, 16.6% in 2009, 
20.5% in May of 2012, 14% in June of 2012, 33.3% in January of 2015, and 37.5% in September 
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of 2015 of the legislative ballot. Like Hungary, an overall increase in the presence of far-right 
parties can be observed as well as a generally strong presence at nearly 40% of the ballot in 2015 
(the height of the migration crisis).  
Legislative results from the second (successful) elections of both 2012 and 2015 were utilized as 
dependent variable data points – as the first elections of those years resulted in failing 
governments. The difference in support for far-right parties within these relatively short periods 
of time deserves some discussion. In May of 2012, far-right parties received 20.5% of the vote, 
while one month later in the June 2012 elections, support for far-right parties decreased to 
14.4%. This discrepancy may be related to the exodus of the LAOS party and the entrance of two 
new, lesser experienced, far-right parties. Therefore the volatility in far-right support, which fell 
nearly six points, cannot be discounted. However, the January 2015 elections show that far-right 
parties gained 11% of the vote, while the September 2015 elections show the far-right receiving 
10.7% of the vote. These elections, while nine months apart show very similar results. This 
stability could be due to both the Independent Greeks and the Golden Dawn being better 
established at this point.   
In the Greek case study, A experiments show a nearly significant negative correlation between 
total asylum applications and far-right voting at -0.47, with a p-value of .69; and a strong 
negative correlation between an increase in applications of selected nationalities over an election 
cycle and far-right voting at -0.90, with a p-value of .29. The results of these correlation 
experiments do not allow us to reject the Null Hypotheses – meaning that there is no evidence to 
support the theory that an increase in asylum applications in total, or of individuals identified as 
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victims of the refugee crisis, has any effect on an increase in far-right voting in Greece over an 
election cycle.   
Greek B experiments which investigate the effect recent migration on far-right voting, show even 
stronger negative correlations between total applications and far-right voting at -0.91, with a p-
value of .27 and for selected nationalities and far-right voting at -1 with a p-value of .01. The 
results of these correlation experiments do not allow the rejection of the Null Hypotheses. This 
indicates that there is no evidence to support the claim that an increase in recent migration is 
associated with an increase in far-right voting in Greece. 
Like Hungary, Greece is a nation in which many migrants wish to pass through in order to reach 
nations with, in this case, a more stable economy which could provide better opportunities. 
Greece is far less restrictive than Hungary, and arguably more accommodating and has for 
roughly the past ten years been slowly recovering from a financial crisis. This has left it’s 
government with far fewer resources than many other EU member states to accommodate 
incoming migrants. Therefore Greece is not an ideal destination country for most migrants. With 
this in mind, the analysis of Greece may suffer the same shortcomings as Hungary in terms of the 
operationalization of migration in asylum application – which may skew the result of these 
experiments – as asylum applications may represent only a portion of the individuals which 
migrate to Greece.  
The results of the Greek C experiment produces a correlation coefficient of -.66 with a p-value of 
.54. This negative level of significance indicates that as GDP per capita decreases, levels of far-
right support increase in Greece. This is the expected result from an economic voting theory 
standpoint. In the case of Greek D experiments which test how the unemployment rate may 
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effect far-right voting, a positive, significant correlation is found at .61, with a p-value of .58  – 
meaning that as the unemployment rate rises, so does the support for far-right parties in Greece. 
Therefore unemployment is excluded as a possible contributor to far-right voting in Greece. E 
experiments which look at how incidents of terrorism may effect far-right support produce some 
very interesting results. When CV3-A, which tests attacks over an election cycle (four year 
period) is tested against the DV, finds a strong positive correlation of significance at .88, with a 
p-value of .31. This indicates that as attacks over an election increase, so does support for the far-
right. However when CV3-B (which looks at the single year prior to an election) is tested against 
the DV, a strong negative correlation is found at -1 with a p-value of .05. Given the very small p-
value found in test CV3-B, it is possible that acts of terrorism have a lasting effect on the voting 
habits of Greek citizens.  
UK 
Only one party has been identified as belonging to the far-right in the UK in this study. The UK 
Independence Party, or UKIP is not a new party but has recently found its first notable success in 
the UK’s 2010 legislative election. Far-right parties constituted 9.1% in 2005, 7.1% in 2010, and 
7.7 %  in 2015, and 8.3% of the ballot in 2017. While participation far-right parties are not 
foreign to the UK, they represent a modest portion of the ballot, akin to Germany and France. 
There is little variance in far-right party participation, as UKIP continues to constitute between 7 
and 9 percent throughout four elections. However unlike Germany, it can be said that the UK 
does have a history of far-right party participation. 
In the UK case study, A experiments show a significant negative association between total 
asylum applications over an election cycle and an increase in far-right voting at -0.61, with a p-
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value of .58; and a strong negative correlation between the applications of selected nationalities 
and an increase in far-right voting at -0.97, with a  p-value of .14. Results of these correlation 
experiments do not allow us to reject Null Hypotheses. This indicates that there is no evidence to 
support the claim that an increase in migration in total or of selected nationalities over an 
election cycle can be associated with an increase in far-right voting.  
B experiments (which measure recent migration)  produce negative correlations as well with a 
medium negative correlation between total asylum applications and an increase in far-right 
voting at -0.34, with a p-value of .78; and a strong negative correlation between an increase in 
the applications of selected nationalities in the year prior to an election and an increase in far-
right voting at -0.76, with a p-value of .45.  Like A experiments, B experiments produce negative 
correlations in which we cannot reject the Null Hypotheses. 
The results of both A and B experiments, like the Greek experiments, show that for both total 
and selected nationalities, and for both long term and recent migration, there is no evidence to 
support the notion that an increase in migration has any effect on an increase in far-right voting 
in the UK. 
C experiments (GDP per capita and changes in far-right voting habits of UK) produce a very 
strong, positive correlation of .94, with a p-value of .22. This means that in the UK as GDP rises, 
so does support for the far-right. This, like results in Germany and France cannot be explained by 
economic theories of voting. The UK D experiment which looks at the possible effects of 
unemployment on far-right voting produces a weak, positive correlation of .08, with a p-value of 
.95, and therefore cannot be considered as a possible explanation for far-right voting habits in the 
UK since the beginning of the migration crisis in 2011.  When testing the CV3-A against the 
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DV, a weak positive correlation of .32 is found, along with a p-value of .79. Therefore like 
unemployment rates in the UK, terrorist incidents over an election cycle are not associated with 
an increase in far-right voting. However when looking at the single year prior to a legislative 
election (CV3-B), a stronger correlation of significance of .99 is found, with a p-value of .1. 
Therefore it is possible that citizens of the UK are more strongly influenced to vote for the far-
right by recent terrorist events and therefore the security concern of recent terrorist incidents 
cannot be excluded as a potential cause for far-right voting in the UKiv. 
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CONCLUSION 
Due to high p-values, in no cases was this study able to reject the Null Hypothesis, however 
some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the associations found in correlation 
experiments. The following table summarizes the results of these case studies in terms of 
significant or insignificant association (SA/IA) between independent and dependent variables for 
both A (migration over an election cycle) and B (recent migration) experiments.  
 
Table 3  
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
  Hungary 
A 
Hungary 
B 
Germany 
A 
Germany 
B 
France 
A 
France 
B 
Greece 
A 
Greece 
B 
UK A UK B 
H1 IA IA SA SA IA SA IA IA IA IA 
H2 IA IA SA SA IA SA IA IA IA IA 
 
The above results show that Germany was the only case study in which both A and B 
experiments produce significant correlation. This indicates that in Germany, an association is 
found between a rise in migration and a rise in far-right voting. What is notable about these 
results is that Germany received by far the most applicants out of the five case studies and has 
the least history of far-right parties.  
While the case study of Germany found association between IV1 and 2 and the DV, indicating 
that increased asylum applications may affect far-right voting in Germany, alternative variables 
of interest may also affect far-right voting habits. Decreased GDP per capita and increases in 
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incidents of terrorism cannot be excluded from the list of potential contributors to far-right 
voting habits in Germany.  
France, the second largest application receiving country after Germany, does find association 
between IV’s and the DV in B experiments, indicating that recent migration may have some 
effect on an increase in far-right party support. The results of control variable experiments show 
that French voting habits are not explained by economic theories on voting, as an increase in 
GDP correlates with as increase in far-right support. Therefore increased GDP per capita cannot 
be excluded from consideration as a potential cause of the increased far-right support in France.  
Besides these findings, both A and B experiments in Hungary, Greece and the UK all finds no 
evidence to reject the null, though alternative causal factors have been identified as potential 
causes of far-right voting.  
In the majority of the experiments in this study, no association was found; though some 
interesting findings have come to light. Countries with relatively little previous support for the 
far-right, such as Germany and France, do show a correlation between an increase in asylum 
applications (migration) and an increase in support for far-right parties. This is evident when 
looking at both total asylum applications and at the applications of individuals which have been 
identified by the literature as being victims of the migration crisis, though selected applications 
do not seem to have a noticeable increase or decrease in correlation in comparison to total 
applications. 
Countries which have a stronger history of far-right electoral support, such as Hungary or 
Greece, do not show a correlation between an increase in asylum applications and in increase in 
far-right voting, in fact, the correlations are overwhelmingly negative and strong, suggesting that, 
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if anything, and increase in asylum applications may be associated with a decrease in far-right 
voting. However when examining how the control variables of GDP per capita, unemployment 
rates, and incidents of terrorism; results in Hungary and Greece begin to differ. Results in  
Hungary find no association with either economic control variable tested in this study. While a 
strong correlation between terrorist incidents was found, these results must be taken with a grain 
of salt, as number of terrorist attacks are so relatively small in comparison to other studies, being 
0 in many years. The most telling indicator of far-right voting in Hungary seems to be their 
relatively strong history of far-right support.  
Greece however does show association with economic control variables. A decrease in Greek 
GDP along with an increase in unemployment both produce correlation coefficients of 
significance. Likewise terrorism over an election cycle also produces a strong correlation of 
significance. These findings lead me to the conclusion that the recent far-right voting in Greece 
may have more to do with Greece’s financial hardships and security concerns than an increase in 
asylum applications.  
Success of far-right parties in recent years in the UK falls somewhere between the low/moderate 
success in Germany/France and extreme popularity seen in Greece and Hungary. This study 
finds an overwhelmingly negative correlation between an increase in asylum applications and an 
increase in far-right voting and therefore cannot reject the null. However, like Greece, 
association control variables suggest alternative causal variables, which require investigation. 
Like Germany and France, this study does not find association with economic variables – as an 
increase in GDP correlates strongly with an increase in far-right voting. Likewise, recent 
incidents of terrorism strongly correlates with far-right voting in the UK.  
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These results lead me to the conclusion that in the case of countries examined in this study which 
already have a history of and strong far-right presence, fluctuations in asylum applications have 
no influence on voters’ support for far right parties , while countries with a lower success and/or 
history of far-right parties are more susceptible to find a stronger correlation between the two 
variables. 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Asylum applications were chosen to operationalize the variable of migration due to multiple 
factors. One benefit is that asylum applications are well documented and easily obtained for 
research; another is that it is reasonable to assume that this number will represent at least a 
portion of individuals which enter a country (which is witnessed by the public), as asylum must 
be applied for in person. However, this operationalization has drawbacks as well. One issue with 
this operationalization is that not all migrants apply for asylum, in fact it is well documented that 
migrants wish to pass on through many European countries to reach an ideal destination country 
with better accommodations, like Germany or Sweden. For example, many of the individuals 
which enter Hungary and Greece do not wish to stay there, and therefore do not apply for 
asylum. Therefore a better measure of migration could be “border crossings”, however this 
phenomena is not well documented, as these instances are not systematically recorded. One 
assumption that could be made is that this study may be the most accurate in cases in which the 
country is a final destination country.  
However let us assume that each person applied for asylum in each country they pass through – 
making asylum applications a more perfect representation of migration. This would leave 
application numbers about the same in the ideal destination countries of France and Germany 
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(the only countries in which the null hypothesis was not rejected). However in Hungary and 
Greece, this would greatly increase application numbers. So what would this look like for the 
correlation experiments? – with application numbers increased, the slight to strong negative 
correlation found between asylum applications and increased far-right voting would be even 
stronger. Therefore while asylum applications is not as accurate for countries which migrants 
pass through, it would not change the outcome of hypothesis tests for these case studies.  
Contrast this with the likely more accurate results in France and Germany. French and German 
correlation experiments found that migration could not be excluded as a potential causal variable 
for far-right voting do to positive correlations found between asylum applications and far-right 
voting. While this is very different from the results found in Hungary and Greece, if it can be 
reasoned that an increase in asylum applications would not change the results of experiments A 
and B, then this limitation cannot account for the discrepancy in results found among cases. 
Another limitation in this analysis is the general lack of electoral data; as legislative elections are 
infrequent, and only occur about every four years. Infrequent elections result in fewer datapoints. 
As seen in the case of Greek elections, electoral support for far-right parties can shift 
dramatically in the span of just one month, therefore one datapoint every four years cannot 
monitor minute changes in far-right support which happen within a constituency on a monthly or 
yearly basis.  
Another issue which contributes to a lack in data points is that the migration crisis in Europe is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, as it only began in 2011. This means that with the frequency of 
European elections in mind, there have only been three or four elections since the beginning of 
this crisis, resulting in only three or four dependent variable data points per case study. This issue 
of a very small n, in addition to the multiple alternative causal variables tested, may factor in to 
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p-value results and the inability to reject the null. Therefore as time goes on, elections continue, 
and migration continues; it is imperative to collect more y-values and improve the reliability of 
results. This should be a doable task as European elections are a regular occurrence and the 
effects of migration in Europe will not be ending anytime soon.  
The limitations that few datapoints (resulting in a small n) places on this study may very well 
affect p-value results, therefore it is essential for future works to increase the sample size (with 
time, and more European elections) so that reliability findings may be improved.  
The association found with economic variables and far-right voting comes as no surprise. It is 
well documented that in times of economic crisis voters look to the left and the right for support. 
Though this study did not always find association with economic variables, looking forward I 
believe it would be worth considering economic factors as a possible lurking variable necessary 
for increased far-right voting. While voters of the far-right have been found to hold nationalist 
(xenophobic) views, these voters may only be mobilized during times of economic crisis. 
Therefore better a better operationalization of economic voting may be necessary as well. 
Another consideration for future works should be the history and strength of far-right parties as a 
possible causal variable, considering the discrepancy found between countries with a long or 
short history of far-right parties.   
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DATA 
 
Table 7: Total Asylum Applications (IV1) 
Year Hungary Germany France Greece  UK 
2001 9,146 87,791 46,490 5,214 70,810 
2002 6,047 70,353 50,081 5,398 102,348 
2003 2,059 49,711 58,660 7,786 59,276 
2004 1,203 34,899 57,940 4,028 39,848 
2005 1,218 26,492 48,253 8,611 29,717 
2006 1,715 19,935 30,048 11,768 26,986 
2007 3,017 17,829 28,513 24,597 27,071 
2008 2,751 20,701 34,513 19,421 29,724 
2009 4,287 26,886 41,347 15,472 28,963 
2010 2,094 40,620 47,168 9,744 21,217 
2011 1,296 45,099 51,398 8,762 25,034 
2012 1,808 63,928 54,712 9,124 26,550 
2013 18,122 108,996 59,884 7,705 28,882 
2014 40,929 172,514 58,404 8,875 31,377 
2015 174,026 441,364 73,742 10,861 39,026 
2016 27,891 721,778 70,240 49,556 37,370 
2017 3,239 215,105 90,740 65,370 40,771 
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Table 8: Asylum Applications – Selected Nationalities (IV2) 
Year Hungary  Germany France Greece UK 
2001 6,127 33,607 14,711 3,692 33,770 
2002 4,832 23,135 16,118 7,906 55,503 
2003 1,014 13,784 15,928 4,871 29,538 
2004 126 8,944 12,458 1,971 18,853 
2005 98 7,155 10,169 2,260 14,388 
2006 230 6,036 8,837 3,816 15,625 
2007 364 7,568 8,899 9,604 14,550 
2008 449 10,807 13,781 6,881 17,505 
2009 1,387 13,958 13,859 5,359 18,017 
2010 926 18,621 15,875 2,405 9,992 
2011 850 21,462 18,388 2,762 10,010 
2012 1,098 25,856 18,970 3,129 9,637 
2013 6,072 41,341 21,139 3,346 11,135 
2014 16,980 88,117 25,852 4,459 14,878 
2015 124,707 256,584 37,286 6,372 20,885 
2016 19,502 559,938 38,600 37,432 16,218 
2017 2,964 138,159 45,448 40,470 17,896 
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Table 9: Asylum Applications – Selected Nationalities (IV2) 
 Hungary Germany France Greece UK 
2005  0   0.0223 
2006 0.414      
2007   0.0008 0.0379  
2008      
2009  0  0.0562  
2010 0.6939    0.0309 
2011      
2012   0.1359 .2047/.1443 
2013  0.047    
2014 0.6507     
2015    .1103/.1067 0.1262 
2016      
2017  0.1263 0.0884  0.0184 
2018 0.6833     
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Table 10:Country GDP per Capita (CV1) 
Year Hungary Germany France Greece  UK 
2000 4,633.31 23,718.75 22,364.03 12,042.95 27,982.36 
2001 5,283.03 23,687.34 22,433.56 12,538.18 27,427.59 
2002 6,665.96 25,205.16 24,177.34 14,110.31 29,785.99 
2003 8,423.35 30,359.95 29,568.39 18,477.58 34,173.98 
2004 10,296.34 34,165.93 33,741.27 21,955.10 39,983.99 
2005 11,205.97 34,696.62 34,760.19 22,551.77 41,732.64 
2006 11,477.82 36,477.87 36,442.62 24,801.16 44,252.32 
2007 13,907.50 41,814.82 41,508.43 28,827.33 50,134.32 
2008 15,739.74 45,699.20 45,334.11 31,997.28 46,767.59 
2009 13,029.88 41,732.71 41,575.42 29,710.97 38,262.18 
2010 13,092.23 41,785.56 40,638.33 26,917.76 38,893.02 
2011 14,118.12 46,810.33 43,790.74 25,916.29 41,412.35 
2012 12,888.31 44,065.25 40,874.72 22,242.68 41,790.78 
2013 13,667.70 46,530.91 42,592.95 21,874.82 42,724.07 
2014 14,201.45 48,042.56 43,008.65 21,760.98 46,783.47 
2015 12,483.87 41,323.92 36,613.38 18,070.77 44,305.56 
2016 12,820.09 42,232.57 36,870.22 17,881.53 40,412.03 
2017 14,224.85 44,469.91 38,476.66 18,613.42 39,720.44 
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Table 11: Unemployment Rates (CV2) 
Year Hungary Germany France Greece  UK 
2000 6.56 7.92 10.22 11.25 5.56 
2001 5.67 7.77 8.61 10.46 4.7 
2002 5.61 8.48 8.7 9.97 5.04 
2003 5.79 9.78 8.31 9.41 4.81 
2004 5.83 10.73 8.91 10.31 4.59 
2005 7.19 11.17 8.49 9.99 4.75 
2006 7.49 10.25 8.45 9.01 5.35 
2007 7.41 8.66 7.66 8.4 5.26 
2008 7.82 7.52 7.06 7.76 5.62 
2009 10.03 7.74 8.74 9.62 7.54 
2010 11.17 6.97 8.87 12.71 7.79 
2011 11.03 5.82 8.81 17.86 8.04 
2012 11 5.38 9.4 24.44 7.89 
2013 10.18 5.23 9.92 27.47 7.53 
2014 7.73 4.98 10.3 26.49 6.11 
2015 6.81 4.62 10.36 24.9 5.3 
2016 5.11 4.12 10.06 23.54 4.81 
2017 4.33 3.74 9.68 21.41 4.32 
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Table 12: Terrorist Attacks (CV3) 
Year Hungary Germany France Greece  UK 
2000 0 8 28 28 60 
2001 1 8 21 14 91 
2002 0 3 17 11 21 
2003 0 2 34 12 23 
2004 0 4 11 4 5 
2005 0 3 33 5 29 
2006 0 4 34 23 6 
2007 0 3 16 15 20 
2008 2 3 13 53 39 
2009 1 3 9 115 23 
2010 0 1 3 48 57 
2011 0 8 8 11 46 
2012 0 5 66 22 55 
2013 0 0 18 54 137 
2014 1 13 14 26 103 
2015 1 65 37 31 114 
2016 1 44 26 31 15 
2017 0 27 41 43 122 
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